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The system on a chip (SoC) paradigm for computing has become more prevalent in 
modern society.  Because of this, reuse of different functional integrated circuits 
(ICs), with standardized inputs and outputs, make designing SoC systems easier.  As 
a result, the theft of intellectual property for different ICs has become a highly 
profitable business.  One method of theft-prevention is to add a signature, or 
fingerprint, to ICs so that they may be tracked after they are sold.  The contribution of 
this dissertation is the creation and simulation of three new fingerprinting methods 
that can be implemented automatically during the design process.  In addition, 
because manufacturing and design costs are significant, three of the fingerprinting 
  
methods presented, attempt to alleviate costs by determining the fingerprint in the 
post-silicon stage of the VLSI design cycle. 
Our first two approaches to fingerprint ICs, are to use Observability Don’t Cares 
(ODCs) and Satisfiability Don’t Cares (SDCs), which are almost always present in 
ICs, to hide our fingerprint.  ODCs cause an IC to ignore certain internal signals, 
which we can utilize to create fingerprints that have a minimal performance 
overhead.  Using a heuristic approach, we are also able to choose the overhead the 
gate will have by removing some fingerprint locations.  The experiments show that 
this work is effective and can provide a large number of fingerprints for more 
substantial circuits, with a minimal overhead.  SDCs are similar to ODCs except that 
they focus on input patterns, to gates, that cannot exist.  For this work, we found a 
way to quickly locate most of the SDCs in a circuit and depending on the input 
patterns that we know will not occur, replace the gates to create a fingerprint with a 
minimal overhead.  We also created two methods to implement this SDC 
fingerprinting method, each with their own advantages and disadvantages.  Both the 
ODC and SDC fingerprinting methods can be implemented in the circuit design or 
physical design of the IC, and finalized in the post-silicon phase, thus reducing the 
cost of manufacturing several different circuits. 
The third method developed for this dissertation was based on our previous work on 
finite state machine (FSM) protection to generate a fingerprint.  We show that we can 
edit ICs with incomplete FSMs by adding additional transitions from the set of don’t 
care transitions.  Although the best candidates for this method are those with unused 
states and transitions, additional states can be added to the circuit to generate 
  
additional don’t care transitions and states, useful for generating more 
fingerprints.  This method has the potential for an astronomical number of 
fingerprints, but the generated fingerprints need to be filtered for designs that have an 
acceptable design overhead in comparison to the original circuit. 
Our fourth and final method for IC fingerprinting utilizes scan-chains which help to 
monitor the internal state of a sequential circuit.  By modifying the interconnects 
between flip flops in a scan chain we can create unique fingerprints that are easy to 
detect by the user.  These modifications are done after the design for test and during 
the fabrication stage, which helps reduce redesign overhead.  These changes can also 
be finalized in the post-silicon stage, similar to the work for the ODC and SDC 
fingerprinting, to minimize manufacturing costs. 
The hope with this dissertation is to demonstrate that these methods for generating 
fingerprints, for ICs, will improve upon the current state of the art.  First, these 
methods will create a significant number of unique fingerprints.  Second, they will 
create fingerprints that have an acceptable overhead and are easy to detect by the 
developer and are harder to detect or remove by the adversary.  Finally, we show that 
three of the methods will reduce the cost of manufacturing by being able to be 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
A. Introduction 
In recent years, the system on a chip (SoC) paradigm has increased in popularity due 
to its modular nature. System designers can pick integrated circuits (ICs), considered 
as intellectual property (IP), that are produced for specific functionality and fit them 
together to achieve a specific goal. This leads to a culture of reuse based design [1]. 
As a result, IP theft has become profitable as well as a threat to IP developers, 
vendors, and the SoC industry in general, which motivates the IP protection problem 
[1, 2, 3, 4]. 
As recently as 2011, it was estimated that counterfeit circuits make up approximately 
1% of the market with a financial loss of approximately $100 billion worldwide [5].  
In addition, the number of reported counterfeiting incidents quadrupled between 2009 
and 2011 [6].  Many of these counterfeit devices find their way into mission critical 
devices for the military and aerospace.  These ICs can be of poorer quality and fail 
quicker than brand new devices from a trusted seller, as seen in Figure 1.  A quicker 
fail time may lead to a number of ill-effects as specified in Table 1.   As a result it can 





Figure 1. Classical bathtub curve, illustrating typical device failure characteristics[5] 
Table 1. Possible Effects of Counterfeit ICs [7] 
 
Traditionally, the normal very-large-scale integration (VLSI) design cycle, which 
develops IP cores, has a number of steps as seen in Figure 2.  When early groups 
would develop ICs, it would be done in-house where they had their own designers 
and foundries and the process was strictly controlled.  Now it is easier, and more cost 
efficient, to split these steps up among groups that specialize in different aspects of 
VLSI design.  As a simple example, one may design the system specification and 




physical layout of the device.  This layout could be given back to the person who 
created the system specification who in turn, gives it to a foundry who creates it using 
whatever process technology they have.   






Figure 2. Simple VLSI Design Cycle [8] 
At this point two new parties have had access to the IP of the creator.  The addition of 
these third parties to the VLSI design cycle creates a substantial security risk and 
although the simple example above only uses two additional parties, many more 
could be added. Logically then, for every party involved, the chance of malicious 
behavior increases.  
One risk of the multi-party design cycle is the addition of Trojan Horses, or simply 
Trojans, to the design.  Trojans can be simple changes to the circuit level design or 
significant changes to the functional or logical design, with the intention of damaging 
the circuit, stopping functionality at critical points, or siphoning off data that was 
meant to be secure.    
In addition to the multi-party design cycle issue, the entities that purchase or lease an 
IP introduce risk as well.  Once a design is completed, it can be considered an IP core, 
and at that point it is vulnerable to theft by duplication.  If a group does all of the 
design work themselves, or with a trusted third party, that the weak points for 




the IP design is sent to a third party for fabrication.  At each point, the third party can 
simply copy the physical layout of the device and claim it as their own. 
B. Motivation 
Watermarking and fingerprinting for circuits are two important methods used to 
protect IPs from unwarranted duplication.  They have been used for a variety of IPs 
such as physical documents and digital media [9] with varied success.  In ICs, 
watermarking methods attempt to either add functionality to a circuit or piggy-back 
on current functionality in order to create a code that is nearly impossible to remove.  
This code allows someone to prove that the circuit in question is their own.   
Fingerprinting ICs is a slightly more relaxed idea in comparison to watermarking.  It 
attempts to either use a circuit’s properties or additional properties that the designer 
adds in to help identify the source of the circuit.  The fingerprint may not be strong 
enough to prove a case in court, but it allows a designer to determine untrustworthy 
customers.  It is also harder to trace and break as there may be hundreds of changes to 
a circuit and even if several adversaries collude, it would be difficult to find all 
fingerprint locations.  As a quick motivational example, Figure 3 shows what a 
fingerprint may look like in an IC.  Each location circled in red would be a location 
where a small modification could be implemented.  The easy to read identifier would 
be the fingerprint bit string where a 0 represents a modification that was not used and 





Figure 3. Simple fingerprint example 
Currently there are only two other major works in regards to fingerprints for ICs.  
There are many techniques for circuit manipulation that result in only a small 
performance overhead.  The goal of this work was to use some to see if it was 
possible to generate a large number of unique fingerprints.   The secondary goal was 
to generate fingerprints that could be implemented in post-production because all 
current methods would require a new manufacturing process for each individual 
circuit, which would be very costly.  These post-production fingerprints would be 
manufactured with “flexibilities” that could be hardened in the post-silicon stage, 
through the use of things like fuses, or other post-silicon modification techniques. 
C. Dissertation Outline 
This dissertation shows the work done to construct several procedures for creating 
practical fingerprints for ICs, some of which that can be implemented in later steps of 
the design cycle, thus reducing their cost.  Chapter 2 will discuss the background of 




security primitives that are similar to fingerprinting.  Chapters 3-6 of the dissertation 
will describe our new techniques for giving a circuit an individualistic fingerprint.  
The first method attempts to create fingerprints by using observability don’t cares, 
which occur in almost every combinational circuit to create a fingerprint.  The second 
method utilizes satisfiability don’t cares which also occur frequently in ICs to 
generate unique fingerprints.  The third method will use the unused states and 
transitions in an incompletely specified finite state machine to create a fingerprint.  
Our final method uses scan chain interconnects to create individual fingerprints. 
Chapter 7 will explain some future work and finally in Chapter 8, the dissertation 





CHAPTER 2: SURVEY OF CURRENT WORK 
Currently in the field of IP protection, there is more new work being done in 
watermarking than in fingerprinting.  Fingerprinting, while a fairly old concept, has 
not had as much literature written about it, especially for non-FPGA designs.  First 
we will go over the details of watermarking and fingerprinting, their similarities and 
differences, then I will discuss briefly the state of the art of watermarking, and finally 
I will go into the current work being done in the field of fingerprinting for both 
ASICs and FPGAs.   
Both watermarking and fingerprinting are considered to be “Indirect Protection 
Techniques” as defined by [10].  These techniques have a list of properties that they 
should exhibit: 
i. Proof of Authorship and Authenticity: the signature should unambiguously 
identify the owner and be detectable 
ii. Correctness of functionality: the added functionality should not affect the 
correctness of the functionality 
iii. Low overhead: The required hardware overhead should be low 
iv. Ease of detection: The signature should be detectable with a low cost 
technique 
For these properties, there is a list of metrics that are also defined that help evaluate 
different protection techniques 





ii. Pm, probability of a miss: the odds that the signature is not detected (although 
exists) due to the tampering. 
iii. Pf, probability of false alarm: the odds that a signature is detected (although 
exists) unintentionally.  In general Pf =Pu 
These two lists help us to determine what would be a good watermarking or 
fingerprinting technique, by giving us objectives to strive for.  The first list is our 
main objective and we modify our techniques to improve the metrics Pu, Pf, and Pm.  
The work in [10] also defines what watermarking and fingerprinting are: 
Definition 1. A fingerprint is defined as a signature generated from a given design 
without altering it in such a way that identifies it uniquely. 
Definition 2. A watermark is defined as a signature embedded in a design using a 
non-invariant mapping in such a way that it identifies the owner 
uniquely. 
From this, one can think of a fingerprint as a change in a circuit that causes no 
functional difference, but can still be observed, whereas a watermark will make 
changes to the output, but not to the outputs that determine functionality.  
Fingerprints can also be used to increase Pu by adding more changes, and using 
specific changes as variables during manufacturing. 
A. IP Protection in Digital Media 
Before IP protection was a major concern for ICs, it was researched thoroughly for 
use in digital media.  In 1993, the term “Digital Watermark” was coined in a paper by 




“provide and ensure security, data authentication, and copyright protection to the 
digital media” [12].  This is done by inserting secret information, identifiable by the 
media owner, into the digital data.   There are several types of basic robust 
watermarks that are difficult to remove using common media operations, including 
noise watermarks, logo watermarks, and message watermarks.  These watermarks are 
usually seen by the user to alert them of the owner/creator of the data.  There are 
numerous other types of watermarks that use more complicated techniques that edit 
bit level data either deterministically or randomly.   
In addition to watermarking, fingerprinting has also been explored in the digital 
media domain.  An original taxonomy for fingerprints is given in [13] where the 
author also suggests adding fingerprints to computer software.  Later, work started to 
emerge in marking digital video and images [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], documents 
[19], and computer programs [20].  In [19], it is shown that these marks can be 
combined to create fingerprints that are collusion resistant, such that if two 
adversaries were to compare their data, it would be difficult to determine where the 
fingerprint exists.  
B. Watermarking ICs 
The first main method of IP protection, for ICs, is that of embedding a watermark into 
a circuit.  This is a similar concept to that of putting a watermark in digital or physical 
media.  The difficulty of this comes from trying to obscure the actual location of the 
watermark from an adversary.  For digital media, this is fairly different task because it 
is difficult for a human to see where watermarks have been injected, especially if they 




One of the older methods of watermarking for integrated circuits (ICs), developed by 
Charbon in [21], requires that watermarks are put in a circuit in different steps of the 
synthesis and layout processes.  This gives many options for the kinds of watermarks 
that are put in and in what layer of the design.  In addition, every layer after the one 
the watermark is placed in is then protected by the watermark.  This is made easier by 
the work in [4], which gives techniques for forcing specific characteristics onto the 
circuit from the design process. 
The work in [22] changes this, by introducing a method for injecting a watermark in 
the finite state machine (FSM) or state transition diagram (STG).  The author changes 
the way the state transitions behave as well as the unspecified transitions such.  The 
goal of this is to make the circuit behavior individualistic such that if someone else 
developed the same circuit, they would not stumble upon the same watermark.   Then 
the work in [23] takes this further by using the unspecified states and transitions to 
create a specific input/output pattern so that a signature may be programmed into the 
circuit during its design.  This method included adding new states or inputs to 
increase the number of transitions that can be manipulated. 
In order to use these watermarks in a court room setting, designers will use a third 
party which generates a watermark and keeps a record of it.  The designer creates an 
IP, submits the authorship information to the third party and gets a signature to put 
into their IP, using one of the techniques mentioned above.  When an adversary 
copies their circuit, the author can then extract the signature and prove that the circuit 




Although watermarks are good for proving ownership of a device with a great 
probability, they have a significant problem.  To prove in court that a device has the 
watermark of a designer, it must be publically shown.  Once this watermark is shown, 
it can be rendered useless by a clever adversary.  This would require the designer to 
recreate the original circuit with a new watermark which would be expensive. 
C. Fingerprinting IP 
Circuit fingerprinting attempts to fix the issue of single use watermarks by using 
individual characteristics of a circuit.  Like a human fingerprints, which can identify 
any one person, circuit fingerprints attempt to identify individual ICs, or batches of 
ICs, that were manufactured.  These can either be placed in the circuit beforehand or 
derived from process variations and other circuit characteristics. 
1. Alternative Fingerprinting Uses 
Patel et al. created a technique in [24] to determine a circuit’s fingerprint through its 
glitches.  A glitch may be considered a temporary signal that is incorrect but overall 
does not affect the performance of the device.  The authors state that if the glitches 
are not causing major issues in the circuit, that they can be used as a fingerprint.  In 
addition, by changing the operation temperature they are able to create more 
temporary glitches that could help them identify specific ICs. 
Agrawal et al. in [25] and Jin et al. in [26], use different techniques that takes 
advantage of process variations as opposed to glitches that can be fixed.  They use the 




fingerprint for a circuit.  This helps them prevent Hardware Trojans, which would 
increase the path delay and change the output of the IC in a harmful way. 
The emerging circuit function, the physical unclonable function (PUF), must also be 
discussed. Based on the unclonable intrinsic fabrication variation in delay, 
capacitance, or threshold voltage, the PUF circuitry can produce a unique response to 
a given challenge to authenticate a device or generate a bitstream as the cryptographic 
key, and is similar in architecture to the work in [24] and [26]. PUF is some 
additional circuitry and thus it will not alter the functionality. Furthermore, the 
fabrication variation is believed to be unique. So the first two requirements of 
fingerprints we proposed earlier are satisfied. However, when an IP is illegally 
reproduced, the PUF information will be changed and thus violate the last 
requirement for fingerprint. Therefore, PUF can be used as a fingerprint for device 
authentication, but not for IP protection. 
The work in [24] and [26], and the work being done in PUFs are techniques designed 
for individual circuits.  None are techniques that are suitable for IP protection because 
if an adversary is willing to copy a circuit, the fingerprint will be completely different 
from the fingerprint in the circuit that they copied.  If this is the case, someone trying 
to prevent duplication would not be able to prove that an adversary is copying their 
work because they would not have a record of the new fingerprint coming from their 
designs.   
Figure 4 is an illustration of this concept.  We see at the top level the “golden copy” 
of our circuit that strictly contains the functionality that we design.  At the next level, 




distributed to the various customers.  At this level, each circuit has an individual 
identifier, in this case a number between 1 and n.  The next level is where the 
adversary tries to copy the circuit with the identifier 1.  For the PUF example each 
copy now has a new identifier as designated by the 1’ to n’.  In the case of the 
fingerprint though, each copy has the same exact identifier as the one before it, 
leading back to the original legitimate copy.  This is the reason that it is possible to 
track the counterfeit or re-packaged devices back to a registered customer with a 
fingerprint and not a PUF or fingerprint as used in [24] and [26]. 
 
Figure 4. The result of copying a circuit with a PUF vs. a Fingerprint   
2. Fingerprinting for FPGA IP Theft Protection 
Closer to the topic of this dissertation, is the concept of fingerprinting for Field 
Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs).  This work was started in [27] and [28], and in 
this paper the authors propose a concept similar to the ones presented in this 
dissertation, except for FPGAs.  Their concept was to take advantage of the FPGA 
architecture to create small changes in the implementation of an FPGA core to create 




are programmed to behave in a specific manner.  The authors of this work rearranged 
where certain functions were placed in various locations to create a fingerprint.   
Figure 5 provides a small example of one such change.  Each of the four blocks 
represent the same function Y = (AB) + (CD), and use the same amount of resources.  
In each block a single a single configurable logic block (CLB) is free and each CLB 
contains a LUT where a signature can be placed.  The blocks where this signature are 
varied so that adversaries have difficulty colluding to defeat the fingerprint. 
 




Other ideas for fingerprinting or watermarking FPGA cores have included encrypting 
the bit stream file [29] and adjusting the timing constraints to adjust a small part of 
the design, for example in the post and route phase [30]. 
Fingerprinting for FPGAs is a significantly different process than for ASICs.  The 
cores are simply stored as bitstream data, and as such it is easy to manipulate them or 
make several copies with unique fingerprints.  Fingerprints can be added in at various 
stages of the core design, especially if certain aspects of the design are forced and not 
optimized by whatever software is being used to generate the bitstream.   
3. Fingerprinting for ASIC IP Theft Protection 
Due to its difficulty, fingerprinting of ASICs for IP protection, does not have much 
research being done as watermarking.  The first major paper on this specific topic was 
done by Caldwell et al. of [3], where the authors attempt to create fingerprints by 
using “specific VLSI CAD optimization” heuristics.  They use the NP-hard problems 
of partitioning, satisfiability, graph coloring and standard-cell placement problems, 
similar to the watermarking work in [31], [2], [32], and [12], with different criteria to 
create independent fingerprints for each buyer of the device.   
Building off the idea of the idea in [3], a conceptually different fingerprinting method 
for the graph coloring problem is proposed in [33], where the authors effectively add 
new constraints to the graph by either adding new states or adding new pathways 
which either manipulate cliques or bridge current nodes.  By doing this, they are able 
to increase the solution space which means that they can create even more varied 





The issue with both [3] and [33] is that these methods must be implemented in the 
earlier stages of the VLSI design cycle.  This requires a significant amount of 
redesign to the circuit and will increase the production cost and time.  This is where 





CHAPTER 3: OBSERVABILITY DON’T CARE FINGERPRINTING 
Our first work in this dissertation was to develop a method to create fingerprints in 
circuits using Observability Don’t Care conditions (ODCs) in circuits.  Observability 
don’t cares (ODCs) can be found in almost any circuit that has more than a trivial 
number of logic gates, and thus is an excellent method for creating a circuit 
fingerprint.  In addition, our method generate little overhead and a large number of 
potential fingerprints for ICs of a significant size.   
A. Introduction to ODC fingerprinting 

















Figure 6. Two 4-input circuits that implement the same function. 
The left circuit in Figure 6 realizes the function  +   =  
.  When the Y 
input to the AND is zero, the output F will be zero regardless of the value of X input; 
however, when Y=1, F will be determined by the X input. So when we direct signal Y 
to the AND gate that generates X, as shown in the right of Figure 6, we can easily 
verify that this circuit implements the same function F. However, these two circuits 
are clearly distinct. Moreover, if one makes a copy of any of these circuits, this 




whether X depends on Y. This fingerprint meets all the three requirements we listed 
earlier. 
One key feature of this approach is that the changes we make on the circuit are 
minute. We can make a connection, as shown on the right circuit in Figure 6, during 
routing and placement; then determine whether to keep this connection based on the 
fingerprint bits at post-silicon phase. This avoids the expensive redesign and 


















Figure 7. Two more implementation of the same function. 
Challenges and contributions. As simple as the above example suggests, there 
remain several technically challenging questions to develop a systematic 
fingerprinting technique based on this idea. For example, the two circuits shown in 
Figure 7 also implement the same function F as those circuits in Figure 6 and they all 
have similar layout. The contribution of this paper is the discovery of the proposed 
practical fingerprinting method and its implementation.  
First, how to efficiently identify the locations in the circuit where we can make 
changes to reflect the fingerprint? Second, at such fingerprinting locations, what kind 
of changes to the circuit can we make? Third, how much fingerprinting information 




this approach? Finally, what is the impact to the design quality such as area, delay, 
and power after embedding fingerprints? 
We propose to compute the observability don’t care (ODC) conditions as each gate 
and use such information to locate the gates that can be modified to embed 
fingerprints. Once the fingerprinting locations are identified, we analyze the circuit 
locally to determine what kinds of changes can be made. Because ODC conditions 
exist almost everywhere in any combinational circuit, this provides us a large space to 
embed fingerprints. When we design circuits by the consideration of adding 
fingerprints after fabrication, we realize that reasonable area and power overhead 
have incurred, but the delay penalty is too large to accept. Therefore, we propose a 
delay-driven heuristics to create fingerprinting copies under delay constraints. 
B. Observability Don’t Cares 
In this work we use the concept of observability don’t cares (ODCs) to create 
fingerprints, so first we will go over the concept of an ODC. 
Observability don’t cares are a concept in Boolean computation.  The conditions by 
which an ODC occurs are when local signal changes cannot be observed at a primary 
output.  An example of this can be seen in Figure 8 below.  When the bottom AND 
gate has an input equal to zero, it will generate a zero as its output. This output will be 
propagated to the next AND gate and generate another zero as the primary output for 
this circuit. The signals from C, A, and B are all blocked and cannot be observed 












Figure 8. ODC on the AND gate 
ODCs can be several layers deep and can cause several different signals to be 
blocked, depending on the input to the circuit. 
Formally, the ODC conditions of a function F with respect to one of its input signal x 
can be defined as the following Boolean difference: 
               =  ′ = 
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′′ =  

′ +  
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′′    (1) 
This equation has a few parts to define.  First we have  which simply represents 
if we have an ODC that occurs at signal x, essentially that is there some condition that 
causes signal x to be ignored.  The next part of the equation 

states that what we 
are looking for when determining  is when the output of function F does not 
change despite a change in the signal x.  The next two pieces of this equation, 
 
⊕ 
′′ and  

′ +  
′
′′ represent the actual functional situation 
where and ODC occurs at x.  
 represents the normal output of function 
 when x = 
1 and 
′represents the output of 
 when x = 0.  The next two symbols 
′ and 

′′ simply represent the inverted output of 
 and 
′ .   
Basically (1) states that when we have a function F, and a variable x, when the 




value of the function F. In the above example, the final output is produced by a 2-
input AND gate, for one of its input x, if the other input is y, then from equation (1), 
we have ODCx = y’. Hence, when the other input has value zero (as shown in Figure 
8), input x becomes an ODC. 
Using this equation we are able to derive a list of ODC calculations for the gates in 
the library we use in the experiments for this work (packaged with SIS [34]), as seen 
in Table 2. ODC calculations for the library cells..  Gates such as inverters, XORs, and 
XNORs do not have ODCs and are omitted from the table.  Other gates such as 3- and 
4-input NORs and NANDs, and 4-6 input AOIs and OAIs are simple extensions of 
the gates listed in Table 2. For NAND, NOR, AOI22, and OAI22, all the inputs are 
symmetric, so we only compute the ODC for one of the input. For gates like AOI21 
and OAI21 that have asymmetric inputs, we compute ODC for all the asymmetric 
inputs.  
Table 2. ODC calculations for the library cells. 
Gate Gate Equation  ODC Calculation 
NAND  =   =   
NOR  =  +   =  
AOI22  =  +   =  +  
OAI22  =  +  +   =  + ̅ 
AOI21  =  +   =  
   =  
OAI21  =  +   = ̅ 
   = ̅ 
C. ODC Fingerprinting 
The goal of this work is to find a way to improve upon current fingerprinting 
techniques.   Most current techniques, such as the work in [24] and [26], use process 
variation as a method of fingerprinting a circuit.  This can be unreliable because it 




fingerprint initially and any time afterward.  These are passive techniques so if an 
adversary copies the circuit, the owner’s fingerprint is no longer present, which 
violates the heredity requirement for fingerprinting and defeats the purpose of the 
fingerprint.  Other methods like those mentioned in [3] and [33] are significantly 
more costly due to the need for high-level circuit redesign. 
Our method attempts to use ODCs to create small changes in the circuit which can be 
implemented in the later stages of the VLSI design cycle.  These changes will have no 
effect on the functionality of the circuit, but will allow a designer or manufacturer to 
determine the circuit’s origin.  They also allow the designer to create specific 
fingerprints for groups of ICs or individual ICs, depending on the IC’s design and 
buyer information. 
Although this work is centered on the concept of utilizing ODCs to create small 
modifications throughout a circuit, several challenges prevent it from being a simple 
task.  First, not all gates that create an ODC can be used to create a circuit 
modification, so conditions need to be established to find locations suitable for 
modification.  Once a location is established, a modification may be made.  The 
second challenge is that the modification is dependent on the location and gates at 
that location.  Finally, once all of the modifications have been made, it is important to 
prevent unacceptable overhead from occurring due to the modifications. In the rest of 
this section, we elaborate formally these challenges and our solutions to solve them. 
1. Finding Locations for Circuit Modification based on ODCs 
Every logic circuit that is created uses a library of gates that determines the logical 




using Equation (1), but not every instance of these gates will be able to be modified to 
accommodate a fingerprint.  There are four necessary conditions that must be met for 
a gate to be considered a fingerprint location and are enumerated in the following 
definition. 
Definition 3. (Fingerprint location).  A fingerprint location is defined as two or 
more gates that can be considered for modification for a circuit 
fingerprint without changing the functionality of the circuit.  These 
gates consist of a single primary gate and one or more gates that 
generate inputs for the primary gate that meet the following criteria: 
1. The primary gate must have at least one input that is not a primary 
input of the circuit. 
2. The primary gate must have at least one input which is the output 
signal of a fanout free cone (FFC), which means that this signal 
only goes into the primary gate. 
3. The FFC in criterion 2 must have either a gate with non-zero ODC 
(such as those in Table 2) or a single input gate (e.g. an inverter). 
4. The primary gate must have a non-zero ODC with respect to one or 
more of its input signals other than the one from the FFC. 
Criterion 1 is necessary for making local minor changes to the circuit (for 
fingerprinting purpose). Criterion 2 ensures that the changes made to the FFC will not 
affect the functionality of the circuit elsewhere. Criteria 3 and 4 provide a possible 
signal (in criterion 4) that can be added to a gate in the FFC (in criterion 3). Each 




in the definition, it is then considered to be a fingerprint location, a location where the 
circuit can be modified to add the fingerprint. 
2. Determining Potential Fingerprint Modifications 
For each fingerprint location that is found, a modification can be applied to the gate’s 









Figure 9. Generic fingerprint change 
Figure 9 has two generic gates, represented as boxes 1 and 2, three primary inputs (X, 
A, and B), and one primary output (O).  Gate 2 represents the primary gate, gate 1 
represents the gate within the FFC that generates signal Y, and signal X is 
independent of the FFC that generates signal Y.  Suppose that signal X satisfies 
ODCY, thus we can add signal X into the FFC of Y, for example gate 1 as shown in 
Figure 9, either in its regular form X or its complement form X’. However, when we 
make this addition, we need to guarantee that when signal X takes the value that does 
not satisfy ODCY, it will not change the correct output value Y.  In the rest of this 
paper, signal X will be known as an ODC trigger signal, as defined below 
Definition 4. (ODC Trigger Signal) An ODC Trigger signal is a signal that feeds 
into a gate, with a non-zero set of ODC conditions, which causes the 




represents the signal that is used to modify the input gate to the 
primary gate for the fingerprint modification. 
In order for this to work, the relationship between the signal X, gate 2, and gate 1 
must be analyzed so that X only changes gate 1’s output, Y, when it also triggers the 
ODC, criterion 3 in the definition of a fingerprint location.  For every possible pair of 
gates that can be considered a fingerprint location, similar to gate 1 and gate 2, a 
structural change must be proposed in order to modify that location.  This requires a 
maximum of n2 proposed changes, where n is the number of ODC and single input 
gates in a library.  An example of this exists for the library we used, in Table 3, later 
in this chapter.  Modifications with certain gates may not always be feasible, 
especially if the overhead costs are too large. 
For simple changes like the one in Figure 9 or those in the motivation example, each 
location like this can be considered a position to embed one bit in a bit string that 
represents the fingerprint.  For each circuit that is manufactured, this fingerprint 
location can be either modified 1, or left alone 0.  This means that for a circuit for n 
potential fingerprint locations there are at least 2n possible fingerprints and n bits of 
data in the bit string. 
In addition to the simple change in Figure 9, a fingerprint location may also consist of 
more than one input gate as stated in Definition 3.  If this is the case, a modification 
similar to the one in Figure 9 may be applied to each of the input gate in the FFC that 
abides by Definition 3, criterion 3. If this situation occurs, k bits are added to the 
fingerprint bit string, and the number of potential fingerprints is multiplied by 2k, 




It is also possible to leverage certain gate combinations to add data to our fingerprint 
bit string and also to reduce the delay that can be caused by rerouting signals.  If the 
ODC gate that is being considered as a fingerprint location, is immediately preceded 
by another ODC gate with the same ODC trigger signal, such as the two ANDs in 
Figure 10 or for example a NOR preceded by an AND, the fact that the ODC would 
be triggered before the X signal is generated in Figure 10 can be utilized to directly 
feed one or two input signals into the gate from the fan out free cone.  The OR gate in 
Figure 10 shows an example of this.  Input signals, A or B are simply inverted and 
directed into the OR gate, removing the need to put X into the OR gate which cause a 


















Figure 10. Fingerprint change that reroutes earlier signals 
This additional method of fingerprint change allows us to add more data to our 
fingerprint bit string.  For every gate combination like this we are able to add at least 
 + 1/2 potential changes, where n is the number of inputs to the ODC trigger 
gate, because all combinations of the inputs to the ODC trigger gate can be added to 
the inputs of the fan out free cone gate.  This also means we can add log! +




may be able to modify the circuit in potentially many different ways and thus embed 
multiple bits of fingerprint. 
3. Maintaining Overhead Constraints 
The fingerprint modifications proposed can cause a large overhead, relative to the 
circuit’s initial performance.   Rerouting paths, increasing the input size to input 
gates, and introducing new inverters are the cause of the overhead.  Two heuristic 
methods have been considered for reducing this overhead, a reactive method and 
proactive method.  
Of the two methods, the reactive method is easier to implement but is difficult to 
scale.  This method involves taking a fully fingerprinted circuit and by removing one 
fingerprint modification at a time, analyzing the difference in overhead, whether it be 
area, delay, power, or something else.  The modification that results in the largest 
change to the overhead is removed and the resulting circuit is tested again.  This is 
done until a certain overhead constraint is met or there are no more modifications to 
remove. 
The proactive method is more difficult to implement, but because it is done as 
modifications are applied it scales well with larger circuits.  This heuristic requires 
that each modification is analyzed before being implemented.  For area and power 
this is simple because any new gates or changes in gates will result in overhead that 
can be estimated using information about the cells in the library.  Delay is more 
difficult to analyze because not every modification will slow the circuit down.  As 
modifications are added the critical path may change which changes where new 




slack on each gate and updating the information every time a modification is made, 
but this can be time consuming for large gates that will have a large number of 
modifications.  For this proactive method, modifications would be added until a 
certain overhead constraint was met, the opposite of the reactive method.  
4. Security Analysis 
As we have mentioned in the introduction, an IP will be protected by both watermark 
(to establish the IP’s authorship) and fingerprint (to identify each IP buyer). When a 
suspicious IP is found, the watermark will be first verified to confirm that an IP 
piracy indeed happens. Next, the fingerprint needs to be discovered to trace the IP 
buyer who may be involved in the IP piracy. It is trivial for the IP designer to detect 
the fingerprint embedded by our proposed approach because the designer can 
compare the fingerprinted IP with the design that does not have any fingerprint to 
check whether and what change has occurred in each fingerprint location to obtain the 
fingerprint. 
However, it is infeasible for an attacker to reveal the fingerprint locations from a 
single copy of the IC. This is because that when the fingerprint information is 
embedded at a fingerprint location, the FFC of the fingerprinted IP will include the 
signal that is not in the FFC in the original design when the fingerprint location is 
identified. Consider the left circuit in Figure 6 of the motivational example, the FFC 
that generates signal X contains only the 2-input AND gate with A and B as input. 
But when signal Y is added to this AND gate, the FFC will include the 2-input OR 
gate with C and D as input. This will make this portion of the circuit not a fingerprint 




When the attacker has multiple copies of fingerprinted ICs, he can compare the layout 
of these ICs and identify the fingerprint locations where different fingerprint bits were 
embedded in these ICs. This collusion attack is a powerful attack for all known 
fingerprinting methods. Careful designed fingerprinted copies distribution scheme 
may help [3] [33] [31], but requires a large amount of fingerprinting copies. As we 
will demonstrate through experiments, our proposed approach has this capability and 
thus can reduce the damage of collusion attack. In addition, it is also known that as 
long as the collusion attacker does not remove all the fingerprint information, all the 
copies that are involved in the collusion can be traced [3] [33] [31]. 
D. Experimental Setup 
To prove the usefulness of this new method, a circuit modifier was constructed in 
C++ based on the description in the previous section.  We started with the 
Microelectronics Center of North Carolina (MCNC) benchmark circuits in the 
Berkeley Logical Interchange Format (blif), which specifies the circuits’ logical 
behavior, not its physical layout.  From here they were put through Berkeley’s ABC 
[35] program with a library of gate cells.  The ABC program can map a blif file to a 
Verilog netlist with the standard gates in the library.  ABC also allowed us to get both 
the area and delay of the benchmark circuit. 
1. Initial Fingerprinting 
Our first goal was to create a program that could implement the details of section IV 
A and B.  We started by gathering all of the gate data, from the benchmarks, 




Combining this information with the ODC calculations in Table 2 allowed us to 
determine what gate combinations were viable fingerprint locations.   
 
Figure 11. Gate depth examples 
Input: Circuit in Verilog netlist format 
Output: Circuit in Verilog netlist format with fingerprints inserted 
Variables: Gi stores gate information for each gate 
1) for each line in file: 
2)      if(line == gate) 
3)           add gate to Gi 
4) for each gate in Gi: 
5)      store gate type, fan ins, fan outs in Gi 
6)      determine and store depth in Gi 
7)      if(gate creates ODC): 
8)           for each gate2 that fans into gate 
9)                if gate2 only feeds into gate 
10)                mark gate2 
11) for each gate in Gi: 
12)      if(gate has marked fan ins && creates an ODC) 
13)           choose fan in with greatest depth 
14)           choose other gate with lowest depth 
15)           add fingerprint to new file 
16)           continue 
17)      else 
18)            Write original gate to new file 
19) output new file 
Figure 12. Pseudo-code of proposed method 
The next problem was to take the fingerprint locations and modify them to get the 
maximum fingerprint size.    For each fingerprint location we chose to work with the 
input gate, within the fan out free cone, which had the highest depth.  We chose the 
gate with the highest depth to our primary gate so that we knew it did not need a 
signal until the latest possible time, reducing delay.  For the input signal, we chose the 












location.  The ODC trigger signal was chosen so that we could reduce our delay 
overhead.  Once all of the fingerprint locations were discovered, a look up table was 
used to determine which fingerprint modifications could be made to the circuit.  
Figure 12 shows this entire process in pseudo-code and Table 3 shows the potential 
fingerprint modifications. 
Table 3. List of possible changes to a gate that feeds into a NAND ODC, based on the library used 
Feed In 
Gates 
New Feed In 
Gates 
inv nand2 
nor2 nor3 with inv 









oai21 oai22 with inv 
oai31 oai32 with inv 
oai32 oai33 with inv 
oai22 oai221 with inv 
oai211 oai221 with inv 
oai221 oai222 with inv 
 
Each of benchmark circuit netlists were run through our circuit modifier and the 
resulting performance metrics (area, delay, and power) were recorded.  Table 4 is a 
listing of a subset of the benchmark circuits that were tested as well as their original 
area, delay, and power measurements, in columns 3-5.  After the fingerprint 
modifications were applied, we re-measured the circuit, and got the new area, delay, 




E. Reduction of Overhead 
Our original results, shown in Table 4, columns 6-10, had a large delay overhead. To 
compensate for this overhead, a program was written to implement the reactive 
method, mentioned in section C.3 of this chapter, tuned for delay overhead.  This 
method was chosen because it gave us an approximate upper bound on fingerprint 
locations and did not require any sophisticated industrial tools. 
The program went through our design and took turns removing each fingerprint 
location we created, one at a time, and tested the result against the original circuit.  
The result with the minimum delay was saved as our new circuit, and the process 
started over again with the new design as the base design.  The program would then 
continue to attempt to remove finger print locations, one at a time, until we reached 
our overhead constraint. 
When no fingerprint location could be found that reduced the system’s delay, random 
fingerprint locations were removed until a better delay could be achieved again.  
Because this was done at random, not systematically, this program needed to be run 
several times to find more optimal solutions.  As a result, the data we obtained may 
not be the optimal solution, but the data usually left a good number of fingerprint 
locations for each gate of a significant size. 
F. Experimental Results 
As we can see from the results, our area overhead is acceptable except in a few of the 
circuits.  The largest area overhead is for one of the smallest circuits and it can be 




cause a significant change in the area.  The bottom of Table 4 shows our average 
results and an average of 12.60% overhead is acceptable, especially when a number 
of circuits have between 20 and 400 fingerprint locations that were changed.   
On the downside though, the delay overhead is fairly poor.  Table 4 shows that we 
have an average delay of 64.36%.  At its worst it is almost 80%, which means the 
circuit would need to run at almost half its original speed.  This is unacceptable.  The 
reason for this result is that the circuit modifying program does not yet check for 
changes that are made on the critical path, where changes would cause increases to 
the delay. 
The major result of this work, is the number of possible fingerprint locations.  Both 
the circuit size and gate composition contributed greatly to the number of fingerprint 
locations.  In circuits with a smaller number of gates, more variation occurred in the 
number of fingerprint locations.  This is because the layouts are more varied as well.  
A circuit with a shallower depth will not have as many gates that have inputs from 
previous gates. 
For the rest of the gates, the number of fingerprint locations was quite good.  The 
number of locations allows for a minimum of 2n possible fingerprint combinations, 
where n is the number of locations.  This means that even if we only have 21 
locations, as in gate C432, we can create more than 2 million possible fingerprints. 
The reason we say that 2n is a minimum number is because for every fingerprint 
location, there can be several configurations, as discussed in section C.  These 




seen in the column six of Table 4.  Column 7 of Table 4 shows the log2(n) where n is 
the number of possible fingerprint combinations there are.  This was done for two 
reasons: 1. the numbers were so large in some cases that the data could not be 
accurately represented in our tables and in the program we wrote and 2. this data 
gives an idea of how much information can be hidden in these fingerprints if you 
think of each combination as a bit of information.  For most of the circuits, the 
number of possible combinations of changes to the circuit is far larger than 2n. 
For gates with an excessive number of fingerprint combinations, we can either 
eliminate some of the locations to reduce our overhead, or include additional 
functionality to our fingerprints, such as error correcting codes or redundancy, so that 
even if an adversary tampers with the circuit, we can figure out what they have done 
and what the original fingerprint was. 
Table 5 shows the average results of our heuristic approach to delay overhead 
management.  The rows show we put on a 10%, 5%, and 1% delay overhead 
constraint on delay.  For most of the larger circuits we still had a good number of 
fingerprint locations left to create a robust fingerprint set.  Our area, delay, and power 
overhead are also minimized. These gates had few fingerprint locations to begin with 
so attempting to put a delay constraint on them was not possible with the current 
system.  Figure 13 also shows a comparison in terms of fingerprint size for our 
original results versus the results of our delay constrained fingerprint.  It can be seen 
that, while there is a steep decline in fingerprint size when constraining the delay, the 




size.  In addition, for the larger circuits, the 1% constraint still provides us with a 
large fingerprint. 
















C432 166 269584 9.49 1349.5 40 68.07 11.19% 54.69% 6.05% 
C499 409 662128 7.62 2951.6 112 177.16 9.25% 31.23% 10.00% 
C880 255 426880 6.95 2068 38 66.58 6.52% 47.05% 5.86% 
C1355 412 668160 7.67 2988.2 118 187.36 9.86% 30.38% 9.44% 
C1908 395 635216 10.66 2655.4 88 151.25 11.40% 46.53% 11.92% 
C3540 851 1469488 11.64 7242.3 179 376.79 10.10% 50.52% 9.46% 
C6288 3056 4797760 32.92 1 420 635.26 6.29% 34.33% N/A 
des 3544 5831552 6.64 23145.3 782 1438.62 11.87% 75.00% 8.13% 
k2 1206 2039280 5.82 5482.4 241 470.25 13.36% 78.87% 8.64% 
t481 826 1478768 6.49 4188.1 178 418.62 13.49% 74.42% 7.08% 
i10 1600 2676816 12.65 9729.9 316 601.15 9.85% 48.70% 9.03% 
i8 1211 2273600 4.73 9621.6 235 541.13 9.45% 67.44% 10.63% 
dalu 836 1383184 10.1 5275 298 507.57 15.97% 47.13% 21.45% 
vda 635 1088080 4.51 3270.4 134 277.42 14.24% 58.98% 9.75% 
Avg 
Change 




















ODC - Potential Fingerprint Size













10% Delay Constraint 49.00% 5.04% 9.42% 4.99% 
5% Delay Constraint 64.30% 3.57% 4.44% 2.46% 
1% Delay Constraint 81.03% 2.40% 0.41% 2.65% 
G. Conclusion 
This work has shown that we can create a significant number of fingerprints that are 
hard to detect, and thus hard to remove for circuits of a significant size.  These 
fingerprints have a minimal overhead since they only require a minor change in the 
gate level design.  In addition, if we utilize the amount of data we can hold in these 
fingerprints, we will have the opportunity to make the fingerprints more robust 
against attackers. There is potential future work, where we can look at how we can 
implement these fingerprints further down the manufacturing line.  Potential methods 
include using fuses as the connections for the added lines so we can decide which 
ones are active, determining where there are empty lanes to where we can add 
fingerprint locations and be able to add connections after fabricating the rest of the 





CHAPTER 4: SATISFIABILITY DON’T CARE FINGERPRINTING 
An alternative to using ODCs to create fingerprints is using the Satisfiability Don’t 
Cares (SDCs) that occur in circuits.  These too can be used to create small changes in 
a circuit so that you can create a fingerprint that causes no functional change to a 
circuit, creates a minimal overhead, and allows a designer to identify where their 
work is being used.  There is also a potential to create holes in a design where 
depending on the fingerprint, different gates can be put in at SDC locations, in later 
stages of the fabrication process for a reduced fingerprinting cost. 
A. Introduction to Satisfiability Don’t Care Fingerprinting 
In this chapter we propose a new methodology for creating fingerprints that rely on 
the concept of a Satisfiability Don’t Care, a condition that occurs regularly in 
virtually every circuit of non-trivial size. This new method for generating fingerprints 
allows us to create a fingerprint that can be implemented in the later stages of the 
VLSI design cycle, thus bypassing the need for expensive redesign.  Figure 14 shows 










A B C D D’ 
0 0 1 1 1 
0 1 1 0 0 
1 0 1 1 1 
1 1 0 1 1 
(b) 




This modification will not make a functional change at the primary outputs of the 
circuit, but it will make internal functionality different if tested. We also propose one 
possible encoding scheme that makes the fingerprint prohibitively difficult to modify 
without violating the encoding scheme or without being detected. 
In attempting to create a robust, reliable fingerprint several challenges need to be 
addressed. First, we need to define where we can make modifications to our IC such 
that we can see differences at intermediate wires, but not at the primary outputs. The 
second challenge is to find a computationally inexpensive way to determine whether 
or not gates have SDC conditions without utilizing the deterministic exhaustive 
search usually associated with locating SDCs. Our final challenge is to make it 
difficult for adversaries to modify our fingerprints. If this is not done, adversaries can 
duplicate the circuit with valid fingerprints making it impossible for a developer to 
track their devices. 
B. Satisfiability Don’t Care Based Fingerprinting 
In this section, we briefly discuss the concept behind SDCs and then how we utilize 
SDCs to create a fingerprint for IP protection.  The goal of this work is to show how 
distinct fingerprinted circuits can be created effectively at logic synthesis level and 
how post-silicon techniques can help to improve the practicality of fingerprints that is 
lacking in the current literature [33, 3]. 
1. Satisfiability Don’t Cares (SDCs) 
Satisfiability Don’t Cares are a Boolean concept used in circuit design optimization.  




gate in a circuit, SDC conditions describe the signal combinations that cannot occur. 
For example, consider the 2-input NAND gate from Figure 14, C=NAND(A,B), we 
cannot have {A=1,B=1,C=1}, {A=0,C=0}, or {B=0,C=0}. In general, for a signal y 
generated from logic gate G(x1,x2, …, xk), the SDC at this gate can be computed by 
the equation 
" =  #$%, $!, … , $( ⊕ )    (1) 
Which means that when the expected output y is at odds with the actual output of the 
gate function G and SDC condition has occured.  In the example of the above 2-input 
NAND gate, the SDC conditions can be obtained from Equation (1) as follows:  
 ⊕  = ̅ +  
When some of these signals fan-in to the same gate later in the circuit, the SDC 
conditions can be used to optimize the design. In our approach, we will use these 
SDC conditions to embed fingerprints as illustrated in Figure 14. 
2. SDC Based Fingerprinting 
The main idea presented in this work is how SDCs can be utilized to create a 
fingerprint that is both robust against attack and unique enough to have one for each 
device created.  By locating gates that have SDCs leading into them, which we refer 
to as fingerprint locations, and finding alternative gates, we can modify the circuit by 
using either the original gate or one of its alternatives at each fingerprint location, to 
generate different fingerprinted copies. We now analyze and solve the following SDC 




Given an IP in the form of a gate level netlist, find a set of fingerprint 
locations, determine the alternative gates at each location, and define a 
fingerprint embedding scheme to create fingerprinted copies of the IP with 
any k-bit fingerprint. 
Before presenting our solution to the problem, we list the necessary assumptions and 
define the terminologies. 
A1. The given netlist should be sufficiently large to accommodate the k-bit 
fingerprint.  
A2. The given netlist is optimized and does not have internal gates 
producing constant outputs. Circuits normally can be simplified if we 
replace constant-valued variables with their value (0 or 1). 
A3.  All primary inputs (PI) to the circuits are independent. If one PI 
depends on other PIs (e.g. the complementary variables in dual-rail 












Figure 15. Example of a dependent line.  B is a dependent line for gate G2 and A is a dependent line 
for G4. 
For a given gate g in a circuit, a cone rooted at gate g is any sub-circuit that directly 
or indirectly produces a fan-in for gate g. A dependent line/fan-in for gate g is defined 




example, in Figure 15, gates {G3,G4} is a cone rooted at G4 with inputs {A,D,E}; 
{G1,G2,G3,G4} is also one with inputs {A,B,E}. A is a dependent line for G4 and B 
is a dependent line for G2 (but not for G3 or G4). 
A necessary condition for fingerprint locations: a gate must have dependent lines 
to be a fingerprint location. 
When a gate, say G1 in Figure 15, does not have any dependent lines, its fan-ins will 
be independent and thus all possible fan-in combinations may happen. No SDC can 
be found. On the other hand, dependent lines do not guarantee a gate to be a 
fingerprint location. Consider the dependent line A for gate G4 in Figure 15, it is easy 
to see that when B=0, we have F=E’, which is independent of A, so all four 
combinations of A and F can be fan-in to G4 and thus G4 cannot be a fingerprint 
location.  
Based on the above observations, we propose the following heuristics to find 
fingerprint locations for k-bit fingerprints: 
1. find a topological order of the gates G1, G2, …, Gn; 
2. for each gate Gi (i=1, 2, …, n) 
3. { if (Gi has a dependent line) 
4.   { find the cone rooted at Gi whose inputs are the dependent line or the intermediate lines closest to 
Gi; 
5.     for each combination of Gi’s fan-ins that does not happen 
6.     { mark Gi as a fingerprint location;  
7.        record this fan-in combination; 
8.        update the number of fingerprint bits, FP;  
9.        if (FP > k)  
10.        { i = n+1; break;} 
11.   }} 
12.   mark Gi’s output as PI;}     
 
We search the gates for fingerprint locations following a topological order (Lines 1-




In Line 3, we trace each fan-in of gate Gi back to PIs; whenever we see two fan-ins 
share the same signal, that signal is a dependent line. Then we construct the core 
rooted at Gi by backtracking each fan-in of Gi until we find the source of the 
dependent line or the closest, intermediate or primary, input signals to the cone for Gi 
that don’t include the dependent lines (note here the PIs can either be the PI of the 
entire circuit of the fan-out of a fingerprint location as we mark in Line 12). Next we 
simulate all the combinations of input signals to this core and observe whether they 
can create any SDC at Gi’s fan-in (Line 5). If so, we find a new fingerprint location in 
Gi and update the number of fingerprint bits (FP) we can produce (Lines 6-8). When 
FP becomes larger than k, the number of bits in the required fingerprint, we force the 
program to stop (Lines 9-10). The way to update FP depends on how fingerprint will 
be embedded, which we will discuss next.  
Correctness of the heuristics: the heuristics may not find all the fingerprint 
locations, but the ones it finds as well as the SDC conditions (Line 7) are all valid. 
This claim states that our heuristics will not report any false fingerprint location or 
SDC conditions. This ensures that when we do the gate replacement, the function of 
the original circuit will not be altered (requirement (1) for fingerprint). We will omit 
the proof of this claim due to space limitation. 
Complexity of the heuristics: this is dominated by the size of the cone rooted at the 
gate under investigation. In Line 5 (other operations are either O(1) or O(n)), we 
have to solve the Boolean satisfiability to check whether each fan-in combination 
will occur or simply do an exhaustive search for all the combinations of the inputs 




complexity will be exponential to the number of inputs to the core. However, after 
we consider the fan-outs of fingerprint locations also as PIs, our simulation shows 
that the average number of inputs to the cone is only 5.24. The heuristics’ run time 
is in seconds for all the benchmarks. 
3. Fingerprint Embedding Schemes 
For each fingerprint location and its SDC conditions, we propose two replacement 
methods to embed the fingerprint: 
R1. Replace the gate at the fingerprint location by another library gate 
where the two gates have different outputs only on the SDC conditions 
at the fingerprint location. 
R2.  Replace the gate at the fingerprint location by a multiplexer.  
Figure 14 shows one example of R1, where a 2-input NAND gate and a 2-input XOR 
gate become inter-exchangeable when the input combination 00 is a SDC condition. 
Suppose that there are pi different library gates (including Gi) which are can replace 
gate Gi, by choosing one of them, we can embed *log +,- bits. So we update FP by 
this amount in Line 8 of our heuristics.  
In R2, an m-input gate can be replaced with a 2m x1 multiplexer (MUX).  The 
selection lines of the MUX are tied to the original inputs of the gate and the data 
inputs are tied to either Vdd or Gnd, to match the patterns to implement the needed 
gate. Because the 2m x1 MUX can realize any m-input function, if there are p SDC 
conditions at gate Gi, we can find 2p gates as the alternative for Gi, including itself. So 




Option R1 will require that new masks be created for each fingerprint, which is an 
expensive process.  This leads us to prefer option R2 which gives us the flexibility for 
post-silicon configuration.  With this option we can utilize fuses, or other engineering 
changes such as the one presented in [36], to implement a fingerprint bit string in a 
circuit at the post-silicon phase. However this comes at the cost of high design 
overhead due to the large size and delay of the MUX.  Figure 16 illustrates how the 






















Figure 16. Multiplexer replacement technique. Left: An unconfigured MUX; Right: A MUX configured 
to run as a 2-input NAND gate. 
 
C. Security Analysis 
We first briefly discuss fingerprint detection because this is directly related to most 
attacks. When an adversary can detect the fingerprint, he may have an easier time to 
remove or change the fingerprint than with no knowledge about the fingerprint.  
Fingerprint detection: when we are allowed to open up the chip and view its layout, 
we can recover the fingerprint by identifying the gate type at each fingerprint 
location (for R1) or checking the configuration at each MUX (for R2). 
As we will show in the next section, there are abundant fingerprint locations in real-




that are visible to output pins. Then when we inject the SDC conditions to the 
fingerprint location, we can tell the gate type (and thus the fingerprint bit) from the 
output values. Consider Fig .1, if we inject B=0 and C=0, if we observe 1 as the value 
for D, we know the gate is a NAND; otherwise it is a XOR. 
Now we consider the following attacking scenario based on the adversary’s 
capabilities. 
1. Simple Removal Attack 
The most obvious attack against a fingerprint is to simply remove it. This requires 
that an adversary knows every location on an IC that our fingerprinting algorithm has 
modified, and more importantly, a way to remove these fingerprints without affecting 
the functionality of the original IC.  In both R1 and R2, because the fingerprint 
locations are required to provide the correct functionality of the circuit/IP, simply 
removing them will destroy the design and make the IP useless. 
2. Simple Modification Attack 
An adversary may also attempt to modify, instead of removing, a fingerprint to 
attempt to distribute additional copies of an IC that were not approved by the original 
developer.  These copies will behave the same way as the original IC but will contain 
fingerprints that the original developer did not produce.  To achieve this, an adversary 
can attempt to modify the fingerprint locations so that they create an unused bit 
string. 
For R1, this is the same as modifying the gate replacement based watermarks, which 




looking for the MUXs. He can try to change the configuration of these MUXs, but 
without fully reverse engineering the design, it will be hard to maintain the correct 
functionality.   
Finally, we mention that our results show that we can easily embed hundreds and 
thousands of fingerprint bits. So we will have room to choose fingerprints that are 
relatively far from each other (e.g. in terms of Hamming distance). Then the attacker 
has to remove a large amount of fingerprint bits to remove the fingerprint. 
3. Collusion Attack 
This is a more attack when multiple adversaries or an adversary with access to 
multiple fingerprinted IPs collude by comparing their copies to find the fingerprint 
locations and the alternatives at each location. This can be used to attack both R1 and 
R2.  
To prevent this, we propose that the fingerprint bit string to be chosen using certain 
encoding scheme (such as error correction or any coding designed for integrity 
checking) such that these bits will become dependent and have certain pattern, 
property, or structure. In this way, the colluded bits will fail to have these required 
pattern/property/structure. 
D. Simulation Results and Discussion 
To validate our proposed SDC-based fingerprinting approach, we first see how many 
fingerprint bits we could hide in a circuit, and second, we want to know how much 




To accomplish this, a program was written in C++ to find all possible SDC locations 
and replace them with multiplexers, following the methodology presented in section 
III.  This was run on a number of circuit benchmarks from the ISCAS-85 [37], 
ISCAS-89 [38], and MCNC [39] benchmark libraries, seen under the Unmodified 
Circuit Information section of Table 6.  The library used for delay and area 
measurements is the Oklahoma State University standard cell library based on the 
TSMC 0.35μm technology [40].  Measurements for area and delay were collected 
using the program ABC [35]. 
1. Fingerprint Potential 
The maximum size of the fingerprints we were able to find for the replacement 
methods R1 and R2 are given in Table 6.  The number of fingerprint locations for R2 
is also listed.  R1 did not have more than one modification per location so the number 
of bits is equivalent to the number of fingerprint locations. 
Table 6 also shows that the size of the original circuit to be an indicator of how large a 
fingerprint can be produced.    As expected, smaller circuits such as c432, c880, etc. 
were only able to create short fingerprints for the R1 replacement method.  We 
believe this is acceptable because a circuit of this size could be reverse engineered 
easily, and any security features could be removed.  Despite this, every R2 
replacement and most R1 replacements could create a sufficient number of 
fingerprints.  For example, R2 can find locations for more than 100 fingerprint bits 
for all but 3 small circuits.  For the 3 largest ones, we have more than 1000 




The number of inputs to the rooted cones has an average count of 5.24.  Table 6 also 
shows that there is no correlation between the size of the circuit being processed and 
the number of inputs to the rooted cone.  As stated before, this means that the runtime 
complexity does not go up exponentially with the size of the circuit.  This explains 
the fact that we have runtimes in the range of seconds for every circuit tested. 
Table 6. Fingerprinting Results Using Both the R1 and R2 Gate Replacement Techniques 
 Unmodified Circuit Information R1 R2 
Circuit Gate 
Count 
Area Delay Average # 




















C432 183 456 3.94 3.86 3 0.00% 12 48 80.00% 53.33% 
C880 304 797.6 3.19 5.16 12 5.12% 38 90 117.05% 39.32% 
C1908 398 1068 4.73 4.02 21 6.29% 53 118 113.86% 39.03% 
C499 454 1164.8 3.1 4.27 48 13.60% 57 74 72.80% 37.23% 
vda 712 2026.4 1.75 7.91 57 11.33% 104 296 113.46% 12.36% 
C3540 855 2357.6 4.91 4.83 24 3.02% 161 522 232.41% 15.30% 
dalu 960 2638.4 5.19 4.21 83 9.70% 128 381 94.85% 10.61% 
t481 1092 3382.4 2.14 8.67 16 1.73% 52 229 51.61% 8.73% 
k2 1383 3732 2.69 8.75 69 7.46% 136 597 212.09% 31.40% 
s9234 1478 4051.2 4.35 4.72 32 2.37% 139 659 124.47% 7.29% 
i8 1638 4492.8 1.97 4.29 6 0.59% 315 650 159.24% 9.15% 
i10 1944 5200.8 5.94 5.44 59 4.00% 257 832 210.23% 6.20% 
C6288 2303 6210.4 15.18 3.14 213 11.50% 379 551 122.21% 6.18% 
s13207 2471 6824.8 4.23 5.67 27 1.17% 106 555 59.91% 3.88% 
s15850 2765 7689.6 5.66 3.97 45 1.89% 221 590 74.05% 3.63% 
des 3629 9716 2.82 4.86 324 10.66% 450 1000+ 66.06% 3.58% 
s38417 8122 21745.6 3.38 5.88 163 2.63% 412 1000+ 44.87% 1.85% 
s38584 9447 25536.8 3.65 4.66 114 1.35% 363 1000+ 36.80% 1.06% 
Average:    5.24  5.25%   110.33% 16.12% 
 
2. Design Overhead 
Overhead is a major concern with IP security techniques.  There will always be a 
trade-off between circuit performance and security because security features always 
need to be built on top of the original optimized ICs.   
Table 6 shows that the average area overhead for R1 is only 5.25%, which is 
acceptable.  This is because R1 only replaces individual gates with another gate with 




For small circuits, the overhead for R2, is expected to be significant.  This is because 
we are substituting standard logic gates, such as AND, NAND, etc., with multiplexers 
which are significantly larger and slower.  As stated above, the overhead will be 
mitigated by the size of the circuit.  In Figure 17 we can see a general downward 
trend for both delay and area overhead for circuits with a 32-bit fingerprint 
implemented.  We chose a 32-bit fingerprint because the likelihood of needing 232 
different fingerprints to mark each manufactured circuit, of a specific design, is low, 
and all of the benchmarks we worked with could handle this many fingerprints.  
Currently, we are working on performance-driven methods to balance fingerprint size 
and overhead (see section VI). 
 






















Figure 18. Number of bits found for a 1024 bit fingerprint with gate replacement limitations 
3. R2 Gate Size Replacement Constraints 
Finally, we wanted to determine what would happen if we constrained ourselves to 
replacing gates that took a specific number of inputs.  We ran three tests based on our 
cell library using the R2 replacement method.  The first test replaced gates that had 
between 2 and 4 inputs, the second test focused on 2 or 3 inputs, and finally the third 
test replaced gates with only 2 inputs.  The number of bits that were able to be found 
are shown in Figure 18.  
Limiting the types of gates we replace caused a significant reduction in the sizes of 
the fingerprints we could produce for most of the circuits, especially when we limited 
ourselves to only replacing 2 input gates.  In addition, removing 4-input gates does 
not improve our overhead significantly.  We found that the average area overhead 
improvement is on average 10%.  The library we used only had access to 2-to-1 

















MUXs.  However we expect that with customer designed 4x1, 8x1, or 16x1 MUXs, 
area and delay overhead will drop.   
4. Other overhead considerations 
There is another important fact to consider when looking at these experimental 
results.  The tests run were done on circuits that had at most tens of thousands of 
gates, and many had much less.  A fingerprint’s size does not scale with the size of 
the circuit, only with the amount of security that needs to be provided and the number 
of circuits that need a unique fingerprint.  This fingerprinting method only makes 
changes to the gate level design and thus, a n-bit change to a 500 gate circuit will 
result in a similar overhead to that of a 5,000,000 gate circuit, but in the latter it will 
be a much smaller percentage overhead.  Figure 19 shows the sizes of the ASICs 
produced in both Taiwan and China in 2004 and 2005, and as can be seen, 
approximately 75% of the circuits have a size greater than 100,000 gates.  This will 
only trend upwards with time, as process technology improves.  This means that even 
with the data in Figure 17, most production circuits with a 32-bit fingerprint, would 
have, at least, approximately ¼ the area overhead and a similarly reduced delay 













We propose a novel fingerprint approach for IP protection based on the well-known 
concept of Satisfiability Don’t Care (SDC) conditions. Utilizing the SDCs in the 
circuit, we find alternatives to replace a gate, which do not change the functionality, 
to generate fingerprints. More importantly, we propose to use configurable cells (such 
as multiplexers) as the replacement, which allows us to do the configuration based on 
fingerprint at the post-silicon phase and solves one of the most challenging problems 
for fingerprinting. 
This approach is promising, as validated by the simulations where we embedded 
hundreds or thousands of fingerprint bits successfully. The high design overhead is 
caused in large part by our current algorithm, which does not consider performance. 
Some of the overhead can be easily reduced or controlled given the large selection 
pool of fingerprint locations. For example, we can avoid picking gates from critical 
path to reduce delay penalty, or use smaller replacement options to save area; we can 
also use customer designed 4x1, or 8x1 MUXs. Currently, we are working on these 





CHAPTER 5: FINGERPRINTING THROUGH FINITE STATE MACHINE 
MANIPULATION 
The third fingerprinting method we developed for this dissertation was based off of our 
previous work on finite state machine (FSM) security, which can be found in Appendix 
A.  This method utilizes the unused transitions between states in an incompletely 
specified FSM to create fingerprints for circuits.  In this chapter, the terms transition, 
path, and edge are used interchangeably to represent the connection between two states 
in an FSM, specified with a specific input, starting state, ending state, and output. 
A. Methodology of the work in Appendix A 
Before describing the work we propose: creating a fingerprint based on changing the 
flip flops in a finite state machine; we will give a brief synopsis of the work this idea 
was based off of. 
The goal of the work in Appendix A was to prevent either the misuse of unspecified 
states and transitions in sequential circuits that were not fully specified.  Figure 20 
gives us a simple example to show this point.  In Figure 20(a) we can see an example 
FSM with three states and their paths of the format input/output. We can observe that 
the FSM is not fully specified because we do not have a power of 2 states, which 
would be a minimum of 4, and not all of the paths are specified, each state should 
have a path for an input of 0 or 1.  Figure 20(b) shows the optimized circuit design for 
the FSM in Figure 20(a), and Figure 20(c) shows the behavior of the circuit design.  It 
can be observed in Figure 20(c) that there are three new paths that have been 




The problem that this shows, is that if we originally wanted state A (Figure 20(a)) or 
00 (Figure 20(c)) to remain inaccessible once it was left, that was lost once the circuit 
design was created.  This can be prevented by fully specifying the rest of the circuit, 
but this can be expensive as well.  In addition, it is also possible for adversaries who 
have access to the device, such as a foundry or design firm, to add paths to states that 
should not have paths to them by utilizing unspecified paths. 
 























(c) The 4-state FSM generated from the circuit shown in (b). 
Figure 20. The illustrative example. States A, B, and C in (a) correspond to the states 00, 01, and 10, 
respectively in (c). 
In the work in Appendix A, we considered a trusted FSM to be a device that could not 
access “safe states” (states that were not meant to be accessed), once the “safe states” 
were left, like in Figure 7.   
B. FSM Manipulation Based Fingerprints 
The goal of this work was to explore the possibility of creating a practical IC 
fingerprinting method, for sequential circuits, based on the work done in Appendix A.  
It was realized that most circuits that are designed are not fully specified because it 
allows for optimization software to reduce performance overhead, giving faster 
speeds, lower power usage, and smaller dies.  As stated before, this is the difference 
between Figure 20(a) and (c).  What was found in Appendix A though, was that 
optimization software, in this case SIS, does not always give a minimally sized 
circuit.  In section 4.2 of Appendix A, the attacker randomly added a transition to the 
FSM in question and in many cases the performance overhead was negative, meaning 




belief that there was a potential to modify the circuit while still in the FSM design 
stage and create fingerprints with an acceptable performance overhead. 
As a quick motivational example we present Figure 21 and Figure 22.  Figure 21 
shows the FSM from the previous section with its transition table.  There are two 
missing transitions from the states that are specified, and one missing state with two 
more transitions that are missing as well.  If this FSM was mapped, using any 
technology library, each of these transitions would be specified regardless of the 















Figure 22. One of numerous possible completely specified FSMs  
Figure 22 is one example of how the unspecified transitions and states in Figure 21 
could be used to create a fingerprint.  In this case, each unused transition was given 
Input Start State End State Output 
0 A B 1 
1 A C 0 
0 B - - 
1 B C 1 
0 C C 0 
1 C - - 
0 D - - 
1 D - - 
Input Start State End State Output 
0 A B 1 
1 A C 0 
0 B A 1 
1 B C 1 
0 C C 0 
1 C A 1 
0 D A 1 




an output of 1 and sent to state A.  This is an unlikely full specification that would 
occur from mapping the FSM in Figure 21 so the chance of collision with another 
non-fingerprinted circuit is unlikely.  As a trivial example, we have 256 different 
FSM configurations, for the FSM in Figure 21, to fully specify the design.  This 
example shows that while not all options have a great performance, there are so many 
of them that it does not make a difference.   
Although this work focused on adding unused transitions to an FSM there were 
several challenges to overcome.  First we needed to determine the unused transitions 
and states in each FSM.  If there were no unused transitions or states we needed to 
modify the FSM further to allow for a fingerprint.  The second challenge was 
determining how many fingerprints we could create and how many we should test.  In 
most cases, there are an astronomical number of potential FSM configurations using 
the unused transitions and states from an incompletely specified FSM.  We needed to 
reduce this to be able to test properly.  Finally, as with the rest of our fingerprinting 
methods, we needed to maintain a low overhead so that the fingerprint would not be 
too costly. 
1. Determining Unused Transitions and States 
Every FSM that is created using IC technology will have a state count that is equal to 
a power of two, and the same can be said for the number of inputs and outputs for 
each state as well.  Many FSMs that are produced will only use a subset of the 
possible states, inputs, or outputs leaving an FSM incompletely specified.  As a result, 
a number of transitions will also go unused as they are a function of how many inputs 




that work, we saw these unspecified aspects of the FSM as potential threats to 
sensitive data or functionality, but in this work they are to be considered flexibilities 
that allow us to make small changes in the circuit that, while not changing the original 
functionality, will allow us to create fingerprints for tracking ICs 
2. Potential Fingerprint Count 
The major advantage of using FSM manipulation to fingerprint circuits is that there is 
a potential for a huge number of fingerprints given the correct conditions.  For every 
circuit that is missing  transitions and has . states, there are ./ potential different 
combinations to fully specify the circuit.  This is because for every missing transition 
at state X can go from state X to any other state in the FSM, including itself.  
Unfortunately, this does not mean that every transition can or should be used, and in 
many cases, fully specifying an FSM that is missing a large number of transitions, 
will cause the performance overhead to climb drastically. 
                        01223456 
3768+8392 =  :;<==<>?/  ∗ 2ABACD/                        (2) 
As an alternative, this work utilized both single and double transition additions to our 
circuit.  To determine the number of possible fingerprints that could be generated 
from each of these we used equation (2), above.  In this equation n represents the 
number of transitions we want to specify or insert to our FSM, 6E,FF,/G is the number 
of missing transitions in our FSM, and 2ABACD is the maximum number of states in the 
fully specified FSM we are working with. 




One concern when any sort of functionality to a circuit is how it will affect its 
performance.  A circuit may have perfect security, but if it costs 100 times more to 
produce than a circuit with no security, it will have very few reasonable applications.  
Hence, it was necessary to make sure that when we add fingerprints to these FSMs so 
that once they were mapped to a technology library, the overhead compared to the 
original mapped FSM was not significant.  
To prevent significant overhead, we can simply map each change we make to an FSM 
and compare the results to the original FSM’s mapped circuit.  From here we can set 
a threshold on the various performance metrics and throw out any FSM modifications 
that cause undue overhead.  Although, it was not tested in this work, when generating 
fingerprints that utilize more than one transition, it will likely be faster to determine 
the FSM with the lowest overhead for a single transition, then use those to add new 
transitions, one at a time and winnow out the transitions that cause large overhead. 
4. Security Analysis 
A major part of any security technique is an analysis of its strengths and weaknesses.  
FSM manipulation fingerprinting is an extremely robust security device because it is 
implemented in the upper levels of the VLSI design cycle, even further above than 
the work in [3] and [33].   
It is important to note that assumptions must be made in regards to security and ICs 
because of the limited nature of their size and functionality.  An adversary with 
significant resources and time can reverse engineer any device and figure out its core 
functionality, but in most cases this would be more costly than designing the circuit 




work, the assumption is made that adversaries would attempt to remove or modify the 
fingerprint by themselves, or with another adversary in a collusion attack. 
a) Simple Removal Attack 
The first attack that is considered, is one where an adversary simply tries to remove 
the fingerprint from the circuit, without adverse effects to the device’s functionality.  
Unlike the SDC and ODC fingerprinting methods, this fingerprinting method is 
implemented in the upper levels of the VLSI design process so the actual fingerprint 
data is almost inextricably linked with the functionality.   
For an adversary to completely remove the fingerprint they would need to reverse 
engineer the device until they can determine the actual FSM that the work was based 
on.  Even at this point, an adversary would need to have an intimate knowledge of the 
device’s functionality so that they do not remove transitions that were vital for 
functionality.  For these reasons, it is highly unlikely, or extremely expensive for an 
adversary to remove a fingerprint from the circuit. 
b) Simple Modification Attack 
The other major concern with fingerprinting ICs is that an adversary will attempt to 
change a fingerprint to one that is not in use or one that another customer has, thus 
thwarting attempts to track the adversary’s malicious behavior.  In order to do this 
well, the adversary would, again, need to be able to reverse engineer the circuit back 
to the FSM.  At this point if they can determine which transitions define the 




previous attack, this is an extremely cost inefficient process and does not pose a 
major threat. 
The other major threat that the adversary can perpetrate would be making small 
modifications to the circuit or arbitrarily changing transitions that they do not believe 
to be necessary to the functionality of the circuit.  This would also require knowledge 
of the functionality of the circuit to insure that the circuit is not rendered unstable or 
useless.  If the adversary manages to do this though, the layout of the circuit would, 
with high probability, no longer be the same as one of the fingerprinted circuits.  In 
this case a destructive analysis can prove that a circuit is a counterfeit and not 
reliable. 
c) Collusion Attack 
The final attack that is considered, is when two adversaries work together to 
determine the differences in their circuitry.  Because fingerprinting is based on the 
individuality of every chip, this can expose a lot about the fingerprint, but with FSM 
manipulation, it is unlikely that adversaries would be able to counterfeit a fingerprint 
that another customer received. 
If two adversaries colluded, they would be able to see where certain functionality of 
their circuits differed by doing an exhaustive run of all possible input combinations 
for every state, or by doing a full destructive analysis of their two circuits, both of 
which are expensive in terms of time and/or resources.  This would give them an idea 
of what transitions would be part of their fingerprints, but not necessarily all of it.  In 
addition, it would not tell them how other circuits implement other fingerprints 




make adjustments to hide the original fingerprint, at great expense, but an analysis of 
the circuit would show it to be counterfeit, and thus unreliable. 
C. Experimental Setup 
A number of experiments were run to prove the usefulness of this method.  A 
program was written in PERL to manipulate a series of FSMs and provide the 
performance statistics for a number of uniquely fingerprinted circuits.  The FSMs 
came from the MCNC and ISCAS ’89 benchmark libraries, in the format of KISS2 
files.  KISS2 is a file format that simply states the number of inputs, outputs, states, 
and paths and then specifies what each path looks like in the format of: 
<input> <current state> <next state> <output> 
1. Circuit Characterization 
The first task in these experiments was to characterize each benchmark circuit by 
recording its performance statistics (area, max negative slack, sum of negative slack, 
and power).  Then each path in the circuit was recorded as well as the number of 
states.  From this it could be determined how many possible states could exist in the 
fully specified FSM by rounding up to the nearest power of two.  The same was done 
with the number of inputs.  This allowed us to determine the number of missing paths 
for a fully specified FSM and what input patterns for which states they belonged.  
2. FSM Manipulation 
The second task for this experiment was to inject extra paths into our benchmark 
circuit FSMs and record the results.  For each benchmark we went through every 




and checked if each state was already assigned a transition for that input pattern.  If 
that input pattern did not exist for that state, then we sequentially went through every 
possible transition that that state could make and tested for the area, maximum 
negative slack, sum of negative slack, and power usage.  Figure 23 shows a high-level 
pseudo code implementation of this. 
Input: state list, edge list, input bit length: inputLength, benchmark  
Output: List of circuit performance stats with edges injected 
Variables: x, y are state variables, i is an input variable copyBenchmark is a copy of the original benchmark file 
Methods: edgeExists checks for the existence of the edge in the FSM, addEdge adds a new edge to the benchmark 
file, circuitPerformance returns performance metrics 
1) for each state x: 
2)      for i = 0 to 2^inputLength-1: 
3)             if(edgeExists(x, i) == false) 
4)                   for each state y: 
5)                       copyBenchmark = originalBenchmarkFile ; 
6)                       addEdge(copyBenchmark, new Edge(i, x, y); 
7)                       results += circuitPerformance(copyBenchmark); 
8)                       delete(copyBenchmark); 
Figure 23. Pseudo-code of FSM edge injection 
This code was modified later to add two unique unused transitions from the list of 
unused edges.  We had to make sure not to test the same FSM additions repeatedly 
and as such, the pseudocode below, in Figure 24 was used to iterate through all 
possible combinations of two transition insertions. 
Input: state list, edge list, input bit length: inputLength, benchmark  
Output: List of circuit performance stats with edges injected 
Variables: u, v, w, and x are state variables, i and j are input variables copyBenchmark is a copy of the original 
benchmark file 
Methods: edgeExists checks for the existence of the edge in the FSM, addEdge adds a new edge to the benchmark file, 
circuitPerformance returns performance metrics 
1) for each state u: 
2)      for I = 0 to 2^inputLength-1: 
3)             if(edgeExists(u, i) == false)  
4)                   for each state v >= u: 
5)                       for j = 0 to 2^inputLength-1: 
6)                           if( !(j <= i && v == u) && edgeExists(v, j)) 
7)                                for each state w: 
8)                                     for each state x: 
9)                                         copyBenchmark = originalBenchmarkFile ; 
10)                                         addEdge(copyBenchmark, new Edge(I, u, w); 
11)                                         addEdge(copyBenchmark, new Edge(j, v, x); 
12)                                         results += circuitPerformance(copyBenchmark); 
13)                                         delete(copyBenchmark); 




For many of these circuits, the number of missing edges was extremely large and took 
a long time to run.  As a result, we did a random sampling of the possible fingerprints 
for each of the different benchmarks to get an idea of what the average results would 
be.  We were able to implement this   by implementing code similar to the pseudo-
code in Figure 25. 
Input: state list, edge list, input bit length: inputLength, benchmark  
Output: List of circuit performance stats with edges injected 
Variables: x, y are state variables, i is an input variable copyBenchmark is a copy of the original benchmark file, 
count is used to count to our sample size 
Methods: edgeExists checks for the existence of the edge in the FSM, addEdge adds a new edge to the benchmark 
file, circuitPerformance returns performance metrics,  and randomState gets a random state from a list of states, 
deleteEdge removes and edge from a list of edges 
1) for each state x: 
2)      for I = 0 to 2^inputLength-1: 
3)             if(edgeExists(x, i) == false) 
4)                   add edge(x,i) to unusedEdges 
5) count = 0 
6) while(count < sampleSize) 
7)       (x, i) = randomEdge(unusedEdges) 
8)       y = randomState(state) 
9)       copyBenchmark = originalBenchmarkFile ; 
10)       addEdge(copyBenchmark, new Edge(i, x, y); 
11)       results += circuitPerformance(copyBenchmark); 
9)       delete(copyBenchmark); 
10)       deleteEdge(unusedEdges, new Edge(x,i)) 
11)       count++ 
Figure 25. Random sampling FSM insertions pseudo-code 
This code first determines which edges are not in use by the original FSM and stores 
them in a data structure.  Then at random an edge is chosen and implemented in the 
same fashion as the other pseudocode.  This code is run until we have reached the 
sample size we require.  For the double insertion, the code is similar, except that we 
pull two random edges, and make sure to check that they are not the same, or that that 
combination of edges has not been implemented before. 
D. Results 
For this work we first present Table 7 with the base statistics about each of the 




of input and output bits, the maximum number of states after full specification, 
current number of edges, the maximum number of edges after full specification, the 
number of missing edges in columns 1-7, respectively.  Columns 8-10 represent the 
number of possible fingerprints that can be specified by inserting 1, 2 or all missing 
transitions in our benchmark FSM.  As can be seen, this number grows by the 
equation in section B.2 and for even our smaller circuits, the number of possible 
fingerprints, based on column 10, is significant. 
Table 7. Benchmark circuit base statistics 
Name Input Output Max # 
of 
States 




# of Single 
Additions 




bbara 4 2 16 160 256 96 1536 1167360 384 
bbsse 7 7 16 1856 2048 192 3072 4694016 768 
beecount 3 4 8 51 64 13 104 4992 39 
cse 7 7 16 2028 2048 20 320 48640 80 
dk27 1 2 8 14 16 2 16 64 6 
dk512 1 3 16 30 32 2 32 256 8 
ex1 9 19 32 7552 16384 8832 282624 3.9934E+10 44160 
ex2 2 2 32 72 128 56 1792 1576960 280 
ex3 2 2 16 36 64 28 448 96768 112 
ex4 6 9 16 448 1024 576 9216 42393600 2304 
ex5 2 2 16 32 64 32 512 126976 128 
ex7 2 2 16 36 64 28 448 96768 112 
keyb 7 2 32 2432 4096 1664 53248 1416822784 8320 
lion9 2 1 16 25 64 39 624 189696 156 
planet 7 19 64 6144 8192 2048 131072 8585740288 12288 
planet1 7 19 64 6144 8192 2048 131072 8585740288 12288 
pma 8 8 32 2928 8192 5264 168448 1.4185E+10 26320 
s1 8 6 32 5120 8192 3072 98304 4830265344 15360 
s208 11 2 32 36864 65536 28672 917504 4.2089E+11 143360 
s27 4 1 8 64 128 64 512 129024 192 
s386 7 7 16 1664 2048 384 6144 18825216 1536 
s420 19 2 32 9437184 16777216 7340032 234881024 2.7585E+16 36700160 
sand 11 9 32 64576 65536 960 30720 471367680 4800 
sse 7 7 16 1856 2048 192 3072 4694016 768 
styr 9 10 32 15344 16384 1040 33280 553246720 5200 
tma 7 6 32 692 4096 3404 108928 5930911744 17020 
train11 2 1 16 25 64 39 624 189696 156 
train4 2 1 4 14 16 2 8 16 4 
 
The area, power, maximum negative slack, and sum of negative slack was recorded 
for every manipulated FSM after being mapped.  In addition to recording the 
performance metrics, for every benchmark that was tested, either for single or double 




benchmark FSM.  With this information, it was determined how many of the new 
fingerprinted FSMs met a certain threshold of 5% overhead for each performance 
metric, independently.  It was also recorded how many of the fingerprinted FSMs met 
a threshold of 10% overhead for every metric. 
1. Single Edge Insertion 
For the first experiment, as stated before, a single new transition was inserted into the 
benchmark FSMs.  For each benchmark, we took a sample size of 1500 unique, 
random unused transitions were inserted, unless the FSM had less than 1500 unused 
transitions, in which case everyone was tested. 
The first major result collected, can be seen in Figure 26.  Figure 26 is a chart 
depicting the average overhead of all of the sampled fingerprinted FSMs, separated 
by metric, and the benchmark.  The important information here mostly comes from 
the general low overhead for each metric.  In most cases, the overhead is not greater 
than 20% and in some cases is negative, representing an improvement over the 
original FSM, similar to the results found in the work in Appendix A.  The only major 
discrepancy was for the circuit lion9.  In this case, the circuit was extremely small, so 
fully specifying the circuit did not leave any room for optimization the way it did for 
the rest of the circuits.  This low overhead is extremely important for security 





Figure 26. Overhead for each performance metric (Single Insertion Fingerprinting) 
2. Double Edge Insertion 
For the second experiment, a sample size of 1500 was used to get an idea of the 
performance of adding two new transitions to the benchmark FSMs.  Again the same 
rule applied, where if there were not 1500 combinations of unused transitions, every 
possible unused transition was tested. 
The first result for the second experiment, the double transition insertion is the same 
as for the single.  Figure 27 is a chart showing the overhead for every performance 
metric, across all benchmarks.  Here again, it is seen that the performance overhead 
for most of these FSMs is below 20% with a few still in the negative range.  The FSM 
for lion9 again gave us a more extreme overhead, but for the same explanation as in 






































































































was that the double insertion had slightly elevated overhead, which is to be expected 
for restricting the optimization space. 
 
Figure 27. Overhead for each performance metric (Double Insertion Fingerprinting) 
3. Comparison of two techniques 
One of the more important pieces of information gathered in this work was the direct 
comparison between the single insertion and double insertion FSM manipulations.  
From Table 7, it is known that the double insertion method would have a larger 
number of potential fingerprints, but if the overhead was significantly higher or the 
number of acceptable fingerprints was much less, it would not be as viable a 
technique.   
Figure 28 (a-d) shows the direct comparison of overhead performance for the two 
FSM manipulation techniques implemented.  There is approximately a 2.5% increase 








































































































technique, and it does not vary much between the different metrics.  There was a 
maximum difference of 3% for power and a minimum difference of 2.1% for 
maximum negative slack.  Again, the average is high because of the size of some of 
the smaller benchmark circuits, namely lion9, which had an increase of 
approximately 18% between the two fingerprinting techniques. 
 
(a) Area overhead comparison 
 









































































































































































































Max Negative Slack Overhead





(c) Sum of slack overhead 
 
(d) Power overhead 
Figure 28 (a-d). Average overhead across all benchmark circuits  
The most important information for this work, and arguably every fingerprinting 
technique, was how many acceptable fingerprints could be generated using the 
technique.  In this work and other fingerprinting work, the term “acceptable” is 
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where the circuit will be used.  For the sake of this experiment, “acceptable” circuits 
were determined to not have more than a 10% overhead for any performance metric. 
With each of the experiments, as the data was collected from the sample set we 
tested, we checked which fingerprints met a 10% overhead threshold for every metric 
and divided by the sample size.  The result of this is seen in Table 8.  As the 
fingerprints were chosen randomly, this was seen as a good indicator of the number 
of fingerprints that could be expected to have an acceptable overhead. 
Table 8. Percentage of acceptable fingerprints based on sample size 




bbara 7.88% 3.93% 
bbsse 4.71% 6.27% 
beecount 8.65% 7.33% 
cse 28.75% 27.60% 
dk27 6.25% 7.81% 
dk512 3.13% 1.56% 
ex1 3.59% 4.22% 
ex2 4.59% 3.20% 
ex3 52.90% 53.67% 
ex4 13.27% 11.62% 
ex5 1.95% 2.80% 
ex7 0.22% 0.87% 
keyb 1.40% 1.60% 
lion9 39.26% 12.73% 
planet 3.40% 2.60% 
planet1 2.79% 3.20% 
pma 7.34% 6.47% 
s1 1.12% 0.87% 
s208 0.00% 0.00% 
s27 0.78% 0.26% 
s386 3.15% 2.60% 
s420 0.07% 0.07% 
sand 0.59% 0.80% 
sse 5.77% 6.40% 
styr 1.67% 1.00% 
tma 12.48% 11.27% 
train11 0.32% 0.33% 
train4 0.00% 18.75% 
Average 7.71% 7.14% 
Using the data in Table 7 and Table 8, it is possible to extrapolate how many 




be considered acceptable, as previously defined.  This data can be seen in Figure 29.  
The chart is on a logarithmic scale so that a direct comparison between the two 
techniques can be easily made.  This is because the number of possible fingerprints 
increased dramatically between the two different techniques.  On average there was a 
5.04e8% increase in the number of acceptable fingerprints when going from single 
insertion to double insertion.  For that average two benchmarks were excluded, s208 
which never had any acceptable fingerprints and train4 which went from zero 
acceptable fingerprints to 3. 
 
Figure 29. Number of acceptable fingerprints for both single insertion and double insertion 
fingerprinting techniques. Acceptable is defined as a 10% overhead maximum for every performance 
metric. 
What this shows is that while the single insertion gave a good number of fingerprints, 
it may not have been enough to give unique fingerprints for each produced circuit.  
Fortunately, the double insertion provided enough different fingerprints with an 
acceptable overhead.  In many cases we have an excess of potential acceptable 
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fingerprints more secure, or to filter the acceptable fingerprints for ones that fit even 
more stringent threshold performance values. 
E. Conclusion 
In this chapter, a fingerprinting technique is proposed that utilizes the unused 
transitions in the FSMs for sequential circuits.  This technique added one or two 
unused transitions to the FSM so that when mapped, the circuits could be uniquely 
identified.  This work created a sufficient number of unique fingerprints for the 
circuits of a non-trivial size.  These fingerprints are fairly easy to detect and are also 
extremely secure due to their implementation in the functional and logic design stages 
of the VLSI design cycle.  In addition, through filtering the fingerprinted circuits, it 
has been shown that it is possible to get a sufficient number of fingerprints that do not 





CHAPTER 6: SCAN CHAIN FINGERPRINTING 
A. Scan Chain Fingerprinting 
An additional solution to low-cost IP fingerprinting is the use of scan-chains in 
sequential systems.  In this section, we will first discuss the background of scan-chains 
and their functionality, then we will discuss the watermarking technique proposed by 
[42] that we based our idea on, and finally we will discuss the method that we propose 
for fingerprinting ICs. 
1. Background on Scan-Chain 
When designing complex sequential systems, scan design can be an important step in 
the VLSI design cycle.  Scan design attempts to add testability to an IC by adding 
control and observational functionality to the flip flops in a sequential system.  This 
can allow a system to forego complex automatic test pattern generation (ATPG) [43].  
Scan-chains are a technique from scan design and has been the most popular design-
for-testability (DfT) technique in the EDA industry for years. 
The main change that a circuit undergoes to add a scan chain, is to replace the D-Flip-
Flops (DFFs) with Scan-Flip-Flops (SFFs).  The SFF contains the original DFF as well 
as a multiplexer and two new input signals: scan-data SD and test control TC.  In a 
scan-chain, the SFFs are chained together by connecting the output signal, Q, of one 
SFF to the SD input of another SFF.  The TC signal is used to switch operating modes 
from normal to testing mode in the core under test (CUT).  While in the normal 
operating mode, the SFFs act as the DFFs that the circuit design originally had.  In 




supplied to the primary output SO.  This entire operation can be seen in Figure 30. 
 
Figure 30. Scan chain design used in DfT. [42] 
In most technology libraries DFFs contain two outputs Q and Q’, the complement of 
Q.  Since SFFs are built on top of DFFs, they too have the Q and Q’ outputs, which can 
be seen in Figure 30.  This secondary output allows a designer to connect Q’ to the 
adjacent SFF SD input instead of Q.  This is called the Q’-SD connection [42].  The 
fingerprinting method that we will propose, takes advantage of using both Q-SD and 
Q’-SD connection in our scan-chain. 
2. Scan-chain Fingerprinting 
To create a fingerprint for a sequential circuit design that uses scan-chain, we utilize 
the Q-SD and Q’-SD connections between SFFs.  By altering which adjacent flip-flops 
have a Q-SD or Q’-SD connection we can create a number of patterns that would make 
up our fingerprint.  For the n number of flip-flops that occur in the circuit, we have the 
potential for 2n possible fingerprints.  In addition, it would also be possible to add 
additional flip-flops to test parts of combinational circuitry so that we can double the 
number of fingerprints for each additional flip-flop. 
This is an ideal solution to both our low-cost fingerprint problem while fulfilling the 
requirements for an effective fingerprint.  With large sequential circuits, scan-chains 
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become almost necessary to make sure that a circuit is behaving in a properly, so the 
cost of changing the DFFs to SFFs as well as the additional routing and wiring is 
included in the design costs.  Our fingerprinting method would simply require simple 
wiring changes so that some Q-SD connections would be switched to Q’-SD.  This is 
significantly less costly than adding additional gates or building the circuit with new 
constraints.  The major change that this method would cause is that the designer would 
need to edit the test patterns that would be put in through the scan input (SI) and 
reinterpret the output based on the changes that are caused by the Q’-SD connections.  




























Figure 31. 5-bit Scan Chain with the second and third Q-SD connections switched to Q’-SD 
If we wished to put in the bit combination 00000, representing a specific state, into the 
SFFs, we would need to enter in, 00110 because the first Q’-SD connection would 
switch them and the last one would switch the last bit back.  The reverse of this would 
occur when trying to read a state out.  If we got 00110, we would need to translate it 
by flipping the third and fourth bits to 00000.  Note that this would not always be a 
symmetric process, when there are an odd number of Q’-SD connections the translation 




This fingerprint scheme would be fairly easy to detect for the person who designed it.  
Given certain test patterns, and known responses, the designer would easily be able to 
detect the fingerprint.  These test patterns would need to be kept secret by the designer 
so that adversaries would not be alerted to the presence of a fingerprint.  It is also 
possible to do a destructive test where the designer would recognize the positions of 
the Q-SD and Q’-SD connections and attribute them to a certain production batch.  
Adversaries would only be able to detect fingerprints for the Q-SD connections that are 
opposite in each adversary’s circuit.   
In regards to removability, the result is similar to that in [42].  If an adversary wishes 
to remove the fingerprint they would need to reverse engineer the device, or have access 
to a netlist at which point they would need to remove the entire scan-chain.  Reverse 
engineering the entire device and attempting to rebuild a new scan chain in a netlist 
would both be an extreme cost to the adversary, making it unlikely that they would 
attempt to remove or redesign the circuit without the scan chain fingerprint. 
B. Security Analysis 
Because this work is based on [42], the security analysis for that work mostly applies 
to this work as well.  The major difference between this work and the work in [42] is 
that many more fingerprints would be created than watermarks.  This means that for 
the coincidence security, the fingerprints should add n more bits, where n is the log2 
of the number of ICs produced.  This will compensate for the number of individual 
ICs that are going to be produced with individual fingerprints.  The other security 




be that the random test vectors that are applied would need to be adjusted for the 
different fingerprint configurations.  
The other major attack that adversaries could carry out is either forging a fingerprint 
or changing the test vectors associated with a certain device, making it is difficult or 
impossible to identify the fingerprint.  Both of these attacks are difficult to perpetrate 
either because they involve redesigning the circuit or because adjusting the test 
vectors will lead to a lower test coverage of the device.  Without the proper test 
coverage, a circuit may be malfunctioning and the end user may not know.  
C. Experimental Setup 
In the experiment, we used the Design Compiler under Synopsys to synthesize and 
obtain netlists from the designs from ISCAS89, ISCAS99 and LGSynth93 benchmark 
suites. The DfT Compiler and TetraMax under Synopsys are, respectively, used to 
create the original scan chain and generate the test patterns. The 64-bit, 128-bit and 
256-bit watermarks are, respectively, embedded into the experimental designs. All 
experiments were run on a 3GHz HP Z620 work station with Linux operating system 
and 12 GB of memory. 
D. Results 
Table 9 shows the fingerprinting results on the ISCAS and LGSynth93 benchmark 
circuits using the proposed fingerprinting method. The columns of ‘N’ and ‘Torg’ denote 
the length of the scan chain and the number of transitions during testing by the 
originally optimized scan design, respectively. ∆T represents the percentage increments 




fingerprinted scan design. The column, ‘n’ under that of ‘∆T’, denotes the maximum 
number of connections among (N-1) connections that can be altered by fingerprinting 
while maintaining the overhead on transitions smaller than ∆T. To evaluate the 
overhead due to multiple different fingerprints, we use the pseudo-random generator 
(PNG) to generate 10 random numbers between [1..n] to index 10 connections among 
the n qualified connections. We then compute the average overhead of transitions 
caused by the 1024 different fingerprinted designs, which are implemented by different 
configuration of the 10 selected connections. The column ‘∆AT’ denotes the average 
overhead of transitions from the 1024 fingerprinted designs. We can see that for a 
design, a smaller ∆T corresponds to a smaller n, which means a smaller pool of the 
qualified connections. To guarantee the overhead less than 0.1%, at least 70 
qualified connections (the design S35932) can be found. This can enable a 
sufficiently large pool of 270 fingerprints. Also, the percentage average overhead 
of 1024 different fingerprinted design can be controlled not more than 7.00E-03. 
Table 9. Average Overheads of Transitions due to 1024 different fingerprints on Benchmark Circuits 
Circuit N Torg ∆T= 1% ∆T=0.5% ∆T=0.2% ∆T=0.1% 
n ∆AT(%) N ∆AT(%) N ∆AT(%) n ∆AT(%) 
S38584 1166 3.31E+08 458 1.11E-02 329 7.07E-03 207 5.46E-03 148 4.00E-03 
S38417 1564 1.13E+09 599 9.06E-03 426 7.96E-03 276 3.22E-03 199 2.21E-03 
S35932 1728 6.72E+07 231 1.41E-02 161 1.38E-02 101 1.26E-02 70 8.76E-03 
B17 1315 2.31E+09 366 1.69E-02 266 1.11E-02 168 7.48E-03 120 3.16E-03 
B17_1 1316 2.31E+09 383 1.23E-02 285 5.46E-03 185 4.35E-03 135 3.91E-03 
B18 2908 2.45E+10 1059 4.70E-03 779 3.69E-03 500 1.81E-03 355 1.16E-03 
B18_1 2904 2.30E+10 1069 3.21E-03 782 3.26E-02 500 1.81E-03 353 1.40E-03 
B19 5816 1.55E+11 2306 1.88E-03 1770 1.30E-03 1156 7.39E-04 826 7.30E-04 
B19_1 5709 1.44E+11 2263 2.57E-03 1735 1.39E-03 1133 6.85E-04 803 6.88E-04 
DMA 1831 2.21E+09 793 5.03E-03 572 5.19E-03 373 2.08E-03 269 1.65E-03 
usb_funct 1517 1.30E+09 456 8.53E-03 326 6.89E-03 205 4.65E-03 142 2.93E-03 
ac97_ctrl 1876 6.73E+08 599 9.13E-03 426 7.73E-03 268 3.96E-03 188 2.71E-03 
pci_bridge32_1 1485 9.30E+08 661 9.40E-03 474 5.72E-03 301 3.57E-03 212 2.70E-03 
pci_bridge32_2 1828 1.40E+09 786 6.51E-03 563 4.26E-03 359 2.19E-03 255 2.04E-03 
des_perf 8808 1.32E+10 3575 1.29E-03 2550 7.91E-04 1622 6.79E-04 1154 4.49E-04 
ethernet 10015 1.37E+11 2042 2.76E-03 1609 1.45E-03 1079 1.08E-03 771 6.95E-04 
vga_lcd 16904 1.59E+12 7056 5.30E-04 5978 4.16E-04 3993 3.21E-04 2862 1.85E-04 





Scan chain fingerprinting is an ideal solution to fingerprinting circuits that utilize 
scan-chains for DfT.  The overhead is minimal as its only real affect is to increase the 
power usage of the device during testing.  This method can also create fingerprints 
with more than sufficient length for most production lines.  With this we can create 
larger than necessary fingerprints that can either be entangled or simply include more 





CHAPTER 7: FUTURE WORK 
A. FSM Manipulation 
There are a number of improvements that could be made to our third method, the 
FSM manipulation fingerprinting technique.  The work presented in this dissertation 
was limited to single and double transition insertions, but could easily be expanded 
include more complicated FSM manipulations.  First, the number of transitions that 
are inserted could be increased.  This would need to be analyzed further because there 
may be a tipping point where adding more transitions will cause unacceptable 
overhead for all possible fingerprints.  It may also be possible to determine the 
transitions that cause the least overhead and focus on them more to create faster 
processes for generating FSM fingerprints.   
Another future improvement to this work includes utilizing transitions outputs to 
create more fingerprints.  The work in this dissertation simply focused on adding in 
specific transitions based on an input, starting state, and ending state, but the output 
was left as a don’t care so that the mapping software could potentially make the 
circuit more efficient.  This cut down on the number of potential fingerprints, and it is 
possible that like the states that were added, there may be some outputs that if 
specified will actually be an improvement over the results we measured with the 
don’t care output. 
 The final improvement that is being considered, is adding new states or inputs to 
increase the number of unused edges.  All of the benchmarks that were tested were 




missing transitions, or the FSM is fully specified, there may not be enough 
fingerprints to uniquely identify each manufactured circuit.  In this situation, 
additional inputs or flip flops may be added to the device to significantly increase the 
number of unused transitions, and only require a small increase in the performance 
overhead. 
B. Scan-chain 
There are also plans to improve the scan-chain work by testing the security of test 
vectors.  It is possible to test the test coverage change due to an adversary’s 
manipulation of the test vectors.  From here, it can be seen what kind of IC 
manufacturing errors an adversary would miss and how it could potentially affect 




CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
IP theft, duplication, and modifications are a large potential problem in the IC market.  
It is important that methods are developed to mitigate this issue, without creating undue 
cost to designers and fabricators.  Fingerprinting is one such method that allows IP to 
be tracked and accounted for.  Fingerprints allow designers to individually mark their 
ICs such that they can be tracked from manufacturing to end-user, if they are registered.  
They allow an end-user to make sure that they have a legitimate copy of the device and 
one that was not resold as new. 
This dissertation has discussed four methods for creating lower cost fingerprinting 
techniques for ICs.  Our first method took advantage of observability don’t cares that 
appear in virtually every IC of significant size.  We also developed a similar method 
that takes advantage of satisfiability don’t cares, for even less intrusive fingerprints for 
a circuit.  Our third method uses FSM modifications to change the ICs structure without 
affecting its core functionality.  The fourth and final method uses modifications to the 
Scan-chain interconnects to create fingerprints that are easy to detect and have 
extremely small overhead. 
Each of these methods can automatically be implemented into a design with a minimal 
performance overhead.  The ODC, SDC, and Scan-chain methods were developed so 
that by injecting flexibilities into the design by the way of fuses or wires that can be 
cut, a developer has the option of adding in a fingerprint in the post-silicon stage, thus 
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Abstract— Sequential components are crucial for real time embedded 
systems as they control the system based on the system’s current state and 
real life input. In this paper, we explore the security and trust issues of 
sequential system design from the perspective of finite state machine 
(FSM), which is the most popular model to describe sequential systems. 
Specifically, we find that the traditional FSM synthesis procedure will 
introduce security risks and cannot guarantee any trustworthiness in the 
implemented circuits. Indeed, we show that not only there exist simple and 
effective ways to attack a sequential system, it is also possible to insert 
hardware Trojan Horse into the design without introducing any significant 
design overhead. We then formally define the notion of trust in FSM and 
propose a novel approach to designing trusted circuits from the FSM 
specification. We demonstrate both our findings on the security threats and 
the effectiveness of our proposed method on MCNC sequential circuit 
benchmarks.   
1. Introduction 
As electronic design automation (EDA) and semiconductors continue to 
evolve rapidly, a company will not have all the expertise and capability to 
do in-house design and fabricate the system it wants to build. If the system 
is designed and fabricated by others, how can the company be convinced 
that the system is trusted, that is, the delivered system does exactly what 
the company wants, no more and no less. This is known as the trusted 
integrated circuits (IC) design challenge, particular for military and civilian 
systems that require security and access control [1-8]. 
When the company gives the system’s specification to a design house for 
layout and then gives the layout information to a foundry for manufacture, 
the company will lose full control of the system’s functionality and 
specification. An adversary can simply add additional circuitry, known as a 
hardware Trojan horse, to maliciously modify the system.  For example, a 
Trojan horse can: disable or destroy system components, perform incorrect 
computation, or leak sensitive information. Most of the existing work on 





In this paper, we explore the vulnerabilities of sequential systems designed 
by today’s design methodology. More specifically, we consider the following 
questions: 
1. When a sequential system is designed and implemented by a 
trusted party strictly following the design specification, can we 
trust it? 
2. When an adversary inserts hardware Trojan into the system, can 
we detect it? 
3. What is the design cost to build an ideal trusted IC, if it exists?  
We now elaborate these questions by the following illustrative example. 
Consider the 3-state finite state machine (FSM) shown in Figure 1(a); we 
follow the standard procedure to implement this sequential system with 
two flip flops (FF) and some logic gates (Figure 1 (b)). First, from Figure 
1(a), we see that when the system is at state B and input is 0, no next state 
and output are specified, which are known as don’t care transitions. 
However, in the circuit level implementation when FF1 is 0 and FF2 is 1, 
which reflects the current state B, if input $ = 0, we can easily verify that 
FF1 remains unchanged, but FF2 changes to 0. This means that the system 
switches to state A. At the same time, we can see that the output will be 1. 
This corresponds to the dashed line from state 01 to state 00 in Figure 1(c). 
Similarly, state 10 will move to state 00 and output 0 on input $ = 1.  
 
 
(a) The original 3-state FSM as the system specification. The label on 
each edge (such as 0/1 from state A to state B) indicates that the 





















(b) The logic/circuit implementation of the 3-state FSM shown in (a). 
 
(c) The 4-state FSM generated from the circuit shown in (b). 
Figure 1: The illustrative example. States A, B, and C in (a) correspond to 
the states 00, 01, and 10, respectively in (c). The dashed edges are the 
transitions implemented by the circuit in (b) but not required by the FSM 
in (a). 
Second, when both flip flops have value 1, the system will be in a state that 
is not specified in the original FSM. With input $ = 0 and $ = 1, the system 
will output 1 and move to state C and state A, respectively. In other words, 
the full functionality of the circuit in Figure 1(b) can be described as is 
shown in Figure 1(c).  
The FSM in Figure 1(a) is what we want to design, the FSM in Figure 1(c) 
is the system that the circuit we are given (Figure 1(b)) actually 
implements. Clearly we can see the difference between these two FSMs. 
The one in Figure 1(c) has one more state and four more transitions. It is 
this added state and transitions that creates security and trust concerns for 
sequential system design.  
In the original FSM (Figure 1(a)), when the system leaves state A, it cannot 
come back. In other words, we say that there is no access to state A from 
state B and state C. However, in the implemented FSM in Figure 1(c), each 




01 (which is state B in the original FSM), when we inject 0 as the input, the 
system moves back to 00 (or state A). If state A is a critical state of the 
system and we want to control its access, FSM in Figure 1(a) specifies this 
requirement, but its logic implementation in Figure 1(b) violates this access 
control to state A (or state 00) and the design cannot be trusted. 
This example shows that there are security holes in current sequential 
system design flow. In this paper, we study how an attacker can take 
advantage of these holes to attack the system. We analyze the cost to detect 
and prevent such attacks. Then we propose a novel method that can be 
seamlessly integrated into the current sequential system design flow to 
establish trust in the design and implementation. We conclude the 
introduction with a brief survey of the related work on trusted IC design, 
hardware Trojan, and FSM watermarking.  
The challenge of building trust in IC is highlighted in a Defense Science 
Board study on High Performance Microchip Supply, “Trust cannot be 
added to integrated circuits after fabrication; electrical testing and reverse 
engineering cannot be relied on to detect undesired alternations in military 
integrated circuits” [1]. The Trusted Foundry Program and the 
complementary Trusted IC Supplier Accreditation were specifically 
designed for domestic fabrication, where trust and accreditation are built 
on reputation and partnership [2]. The notions of trusted and 
trustworthiness are presented in [3], where the authors discuss the 
challenges, opportunities, call for new initiatives and programs to establish 
principles, tools, and standards for building trusted hardware. Trimberger 
in [4] argues that trusted IC can be built on a field programmable gate array 
(FPGA) platform because it separates the manufacturing process from the 
design process. However, the base array still needs to be verified through 
manufacture and trust still needs to be built during the design process. Suh 
and Devadas [5] propose physical unclonable functions (PUFs) based on 
transistor and wire delay to uniquely identify a chip. Logic obfuscation 
techniques have been proposed recently to solve the IC piracy problem and 
build trusted IC [6, 7]. However, none of these efforts can be used to verify 
whether the chip contains unwanted functionalities. Gu et al. [8] develop 
information hiding method for trusted system design where they impose 
additional design constraints in the hope that design with unwanted 
functionalities will incur  noticeable performance degradation and thus can 
be caught. This novelty concept is hard to be implemented due to the 
complexity of design process.  
Hardware Trojan refers to any kind of malicious modification of the IC. It 
is one of the more serious threats to trusted IC design. Banga and Hsiao [9] 
propose a circuit partition based approach to detect and locate the 
embedded Trojan. Rad et al. [10] develop a power supply transient signal 




power port signals to determine the smallest detectable Trojan. Wang et al. 
[11] explore the wide range of malicious alternations of ICs that are possible 
and propose a general framework for their classification as well as several 
Trojan detection strategies. Gong and Makkes [12] present a Trojan side-
channel based on PUF that can successfully attack block ciphers. Wei et al. 
[13] develop a set of hardware Trojan benchmarks that are the most 
challenging representative test cases for side-channel based hardware 
Trojan detection techniques. The existing hardware Trojan detection 
approaches rely on catching the misbehavior of the IC caused by the 
hardware Trojan embedded into a known design. When a hardware Trojan 
is added during the design process and integrated with the required 
functionalities of the IC, these approaches will not be effective. 
There is a rich body of research work on FSM watermarking, for the 
protection of FSM design intellectual property [14-19]. These techniques 
usually rely on the modification of the state transition graph at the 
behavioral synthesis level to embed watermark related to user-specific 
information for identification purpose. In [14], Oliveira proposes to create 
watermarks based on a set of redundant states which can only be traversed 
when a user-specific input sequence is loaded. Lewandowski et al. [15] and 
Zhang and Chang [16] propose watermarking schemes based on state 
encoding. Torunoglu and Charbon [17] introduce extra state transitions in 
the FSM to produce output that carries watermark. Abdel-Hamid et al. [18] 
improve this method by utilizing the existing transitions for watermarking 
and successfully reduce the high-overhead caused by extra state 
transitions. Cui et al. [19] propose an improved scheme that increases the 
ratio of the number of existing transitions used during the watermarking 
process to further reduce overhead. The concept behind these FSM 
watermarking techniques is to embed additional information into the FSM, 
which is similar to hardware Trojan insertion. However, the added 
information is for authorship proof and normally does not carry any 
malicious functionality (like a hardware Trojan does).  
The rest of the article is organized as follows: in Section 2, we give the 
necessary background of finite state machine. In Section 3, we elaborate 
the unsecured safe-state vulnerability in the current design, introduce two 
simple but powerful attacks, and propose countermeasures. We conduct 
experiments on standard benchmark circuits and report the results in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes the article. 
2. Background of Finite State Machine 
A finite state machine (FSM) is defined as a 6-tuple <I,S, δ,S0,O, λ> where: 
 I is the input alphabet; 




 δ : S × I → S is the next-state function; 
 S0 ⊆ S is the set of initial states; 
 O is the output alphabet; 
 λ : S × I → O is the output function. 
An FSM can be conveniently represented as a directed weighted (or labeled) 
graph # = I, J, where each vertex K∈I represents a state 2∈"; an edge 
L, K∈J represents the transition from current state u to its next state v, 
the weight (or label) on the edge indicates the input-output pair determined 
by the output function λ. That is, if the edge L, K is labeled $/), then we 
have  ML, $ = K and NL, $ = ). (See Figure 1(a) and Figure 1(c) for an 
example). Such graph is often referred to as state transition graph.   
An FSM is completely specified if both the next-state function M and the 
output function N are defined on all possible current state and input pairs 
L, $. Otherwise, either M, N or both will be undefined on some current state 
and input pairs L, $. When δ is undefined, we call this a don’t care 
transition; when λ is undefined, its output function has a don’t care. The 
FSM is called incompletely specified if this happens. 
We say that a state K is reachable from state L if and only if there is a 
directed path from L to v, that is, there is an input sequence following which 
the state will move from L to K. We define the reachable set of state u as 
OL = {K∈I| K 32 86RSℎR456 U81. L} 
which is the set of all states that the system can reach from u and the 
starting set of  state L as 
"L = {K∈I| L 32 86RSℎR456 U81. K} 
which is the set of states from which the system can reach u.  
For example, in Figure 1(a), O  =  {, }, O  =  {}, O = {},  "  =
φ , "  =  {},  and "  =  {, }, where "  = φ  because there is no state 
transition going to state A.  
Considering the FSM W’ generated from the circuit implementation of a 
given FSM W, based on whether we want to control the access to a state in 
W and the reachability of the state in W’, the states in W can be partitioned 
into three groups: 
• A state v is safe if we want to control the access to K in W and K can 
only be accessed in W’ from its starting states "K.  
• A state K is unsafe if we want to control the access to K in W but K 
can be accessed in M’ from states that are not in "K.  




An adversary may attempt to gain access to a protected state v from states 
that are not in "K. If the adversary succeeds, the state becomes unsafe. 
Otherwise, all the states that we want to protect are safe and the 
implementation of the FSM is trusted. The goal of trusted sequential 
system design is to guarantee that the circuit implementation will be 
trusted.  
We conclude this section with the two standard phases of FSM synthesis: 
state minimization and state encoding, both of which are critical in our 
proposed method to establish trust in FSM implementation.  
Two FSMs are equivalent if from the initial state, on any input sequence, 
they both create the same output sequence. Finding an equivalent FSM 
with minimal number of states is generally referred as state minimization 
or state reduction problem. State minimization is an effective approach in 
logic synthesis to optimize sequential circuit design in terms of area and 
power. It can be solved optimally in completely specified FSMs and the 
solution is unique [20]. For incompletely specified machines, although the 
problem is NP-hard, there are standard approaches to solve the state 
reduction problem [21]. 
The next phase of FSM synthesis is state assignment or state encoding 
where the goal is to assign distinct binary codes to each state of the FSM 
such that the sequential circuit modeled by the FSM can be efficient in 
terms of area, performance and/or power. There have been many techniques 
to solve the state encoding problem based on different optimization 
objectives and implementation technologies [22]. Each bit of the binary code 
will be implemented by one flip flop and the combinational part of the 
circuitry can be designed to generate input signals to each flip flop and 
produce the desired output. This will give us a logic implementation of the 
FSM and concludes the sequential system design. 
3. Trust, Attacks, and Countermeasure 
3.1 Trusted FSM and Trusted Logic Implementation 
Intuitively, we can define trust as follows: when a sequential system is 
specified as an FSM, it is trusted as long as the FSM makes correct 
transitions from the current state to the next state and produces correct 
outputs based on the input values. From this definition, it is clear that if an 
FSM is trusted, all of its equivalent FSMs will be trusted, which implies 
that whether an FSM is trusted will not change during the state 
minimization phase. However, this may change during the state encoding 
and combinational logic design phase of the FSM synthesis.   
First, as we have seen from the illustrative example in Figure 1, additional 
states and additional transitions may be introduced when we design the 




the next state or the output of the transition or both are not specified. Logic 
design tools will take advantage of these don’t care conditions to optimize 
the design for performance improvement, area reduction, or power 
efficiency. But when the system (or the FSM) is implemented in the circuit 
level, these don’t cares will disappear. The circuit will generate 
deterministic next states and output for each of the don’t care conditions. 
These deterministic values are assigned by CAD tools for optimization 
purpose and they may make the design untrusted. For example, the next 
state of a don’t care transition may be assigned to a state for which access 
control is required and thus produce an illegal entry to that protected state 
(i.e., making the state unsafe). 
A second type of implicit violation of trust comes from the nature of digital 
logic implementation. When the original FSM has n states after state 
minimization, it will need a minimum of X =  517!  bits to encode these 
states and some encoding schemes that target other design objectives (such 
as testability and power) may use even longer codes. As we have seen in the 
illustrative example, when n is not a power of 2, which happens most of the 
time, those unused codes will introduce extra states into the system, and 
all transitions from those extra states will be treated as don’t care 
transitions during logic synthesis, introducing uncertainty about the trust 
of the design and implementation of the FSM.  
By analyzing the logic implementation of a given FSM W, we can build an 
FSM W’ that captures the behavior of the circuit. When W and W’ are 
equivalent, we say that the logic implementation is trusted. From the above 
discussion, we conclude that  
Theorem 1. A sequential system will have a trusted logic implementation 
from the traditional synthesis flow if and only if  
a) the system is completely specified 
b) the number of states after state reduction is a power of 2 
c) code with the minimal length is used for state encoding.  
[Proof]: The analysis above shows all the three conditions are necessary. To 
see they are also sufficient, condition a) indicates that there is no don’t care 
transitions; conditions b) and c) guarantee that in the implementation of 
the system there is no additional states. Therefore, the state transition 
graph of the sequential system will be unique and cannot be modified. This 
ensures that the system will be trusted.         
An ideal trusted IC can be built if the system satisfies the three conditions 
in Theorem 1. However, it is unrealistic to assume that conditions a) and b) 
will be satisfied. First, given the complexity of today’s system, it is 
impossible to completely specify the system’s behavior of all possible input 
values. Second, there are no effective methods to ensure that the number of 




don’t cares (condition a)) and no flexibility in choosing the code length 
(condition c)), the design will be tightly constrained and hard to optimize. 
In the experimentation, when we modify the system specification to comply 
with conditions a)-c), the quality of design drops significantly in terms of 
area, power, and delay.  Detailed experimental results can be found in 
Section 4.     
In the rest of this article, we study the trust of FSMs using state 
reachability as a metric. Within this context, we consider a given FSM, W =
I, J (e.g. Figure 1(a)), and its logic implementation (e.g. Figure 1(b)), let 
W’ = I’, J’  be the completely specified FSM generated from the logic 
implementation of W (e.g. Figure 1(c)). Clearly, as graphs, W will be a 
subgraph of W’. We say that the logic implementation of M is trusted if for 
each state K∈ I and its corresponding state K’∈ I’, K and K’ have the 
same reachable sets OK = OK’ and the same starting sets "K = "K’
. Intuitively, this means that in W’, we cannot reach any new states from 
K OK = OK’ and no new state can reach K either "K = "K’. 
Apparently, the logic implementation in Figure 1(b) and the corresponding 
FSM in Figure 1(c) cannot be trusted. 
Theorem 2. The following are equivalent definitions for trusted logic 
implementation: for any state K∈ I in an FSM W and its corresponding state 
K’∈ I’ in the logic implementation of M,  
(1) OK = OK’ RY "K = "K’ 
(2) OK = OK’ 
(3) "K = "K’ 
[Proof]: We need to show that (1) ⇔ (2) ⇔ (3). Since (1) is the conjunction of 
(2) and (3), it suffices to show that (2) ⇔ (3). We prove (2) ⇒ (3) by 
contradiction as follows. (3) ⇒ (2) can be proved similarly.  
If (2) holds, but (3) does not, then there must exist a pair of states K∈I and 
its corresponding state K’∈ I’ such that OK = OK’ but "K ≠  "K’
. That is, we can find a state L∈"K but its corresponding state L’∉"K’
 or vice versa. From the definition, we know that L∈"K is equivalent to 
K∈OL. Hence, if we have L∈"K but L’∉"K’ as we just found, we 
should also have K∈OL but K’∉OL’, which implies that OL≠ OL’, 
contradicting the assumption that (2) holds.                 
3.2 Attacks to untrusted FSMs 
We consider the following two attacking scenarios for the sequential system 
based on what the adversary can access:  
Case I: the adversary can only access the logic implementation of the 
system or FSM M’. The attacking objective is to gain access to the states 
that are not accessible as specified in the original specification W. That 




Case II: the adversary gets hold of the original system specification, W, 
in the format of FSM and wants to establish a path to reach certain 
unreachable state without being detected. In this case, the attacker can 
implement such path into the design. However, the challenge is how to 
disguise the secret path.  
We describe two naive attacks, one for each case. As we will show in the 
experimental results section, these two simple attacks turn out to be quite 
powerful and challenging to defend. Therefore, we do not consider any 
sophisticated attacks although they can be developed.  
Attack I: The adversary is aware of the vulnerability of the logic 
implementation of the FSM following the traditional design flow. 
Therefore, he can launch the “random walk attack” and hope to gain 
access to states that he is not supposed to reach. In this attack, the 
adversary will try random input sequences. If it leads to the discovery of 
a previously safe state (i.e., states that cannot be reached by the 
adversary according to the design specification), the attack will be 
successful. This is possible because the FSM synthesis tools will assign 
values to the don’t care transitions in order to optimize design objectives 
such as delay, area, or power. These added transitions may make some 
of the safe states reachable from states that do not belong to their 
starting states set and therefore, making them unsafe.     
Attack II: In this case, the adversary has the original FSM specification 
of the system before it is synthesized. If he wants to access state v from 
a state L∉"K, the adversary can simply do the following: 
• Check whether there is any don’t care transition from L, if so, he 
simply makes K as the next state for that transition. This will give 
him an unauthorized access to state K in the logic implementation of 
the system. 
• If the state transitions from state L are all specified, he can check 
whether there are any don’t care transitions from a vertex/state that 
belongs to OL, and try to connect that state to K to create a path 
from L to K.   
• If this also fails, then state v in the system is safe with respect to 
state L in the sense that one can never reach state K from state L. In 
this case, the attack fails. 
Finally, we mention that in case II, the adversary can take advantage of 
the new states that logic synthesis tools will introduce (that is, when the 
number of states is not a power of 2 or non-minimal length encoding is 
used). He can simply launch attack by connecting any of the new states 




3.3 A naive attempt to build trusted FSM 
The sufficient and necessary conditions in Section 3.1 for a sequential 
system to be trustworthy  actually gives the following constructive method 
to build trusted FSM: 
i. perform state reduction to reduce the number of states  
ii. add new states {21, 22, . . . , 2X} to the FSM such that the total number 
of states becomes a power of 2 
iii. add state transitions {21 22, 22 23, . . . , 2X  21} on any input 
value. 
iv. for the other don’t care transitions, make s1 as their next state 
v. use minimal length codes for state encoding 
Apparently, the logic implementation of the FSM following the above 
procedure satisfies conditions a)-c) in Section 3.1: step iv ensures that the 
FSM is completely specified; step ii ensures that the number of states is a 
power of 2; and step v requires the minimal length encoding.  
The only non-trivial part of this procedure is the cycle created in step iii. By 
doing this, we make these new states not equivalent to each other, and thus 
prevent the FSM synthesis tools from merging these states. This will 
ensure that the total number of  states is a power of 2. 
From the analysis in early part of this section, we know that the FSM built 
by the above procedure will guarantee a trusted logic implementation of the 
sequential system. However, such implementation will have very high 
design overhead in terms of area, power and clock speed. We will report this 
finding in the experimental results section (Section 4).  
3.4 A practical approach to building a trusted FSM 
To reduce the high design overhead for building trusted FSMs, we propose 
a novel method that combines modification of gate level circuit and the 
concept of FSM re-engineering introduced in [23]. Before describing our 
approach, we mention that to limit the access to a protected state K, we need 
to protect all the states in K’s starting set of states. Therefore, in the 
following discussion, when we consider a state to be protected, we consider 
all the states in its starting set of states as well.    
 
 
Figure 2: A simple 2-state FSM. 
To illustrate the key idea of our approach, we consider a simple 2-state FSM 
shown in Figure 2. We assume that state 1 is the safe state and it cannot 
be reached from state 0. We can add a transition to enforce that the system 






transitions will incur high overhead. Instead, we consider how to make 
state 1 safe at the circuit level. Without loss of generality, we assume that 
one T flip-flop is used to implement this system. We will use the flip flop 
content as a feedback signal to control the flip flop input signal (shown as 
the line with arrowhead in Figure 3). With the help of this new T flip flop, 
we see that when the system is at state 1, the feedback signal will not 
impact the functionality of the flip flop input signal. However, when the 
system is at the normal state 0, the controlled input signal will disable the 
T flip flop, preventing the system to go to the safe state 1. 
Based on this observation, we propose to make the protected states safe by 
grouping them and allocating them codes with the same prefix (that is, the 
leading bits of the codes). For example, when the minimal code length is 5 
and there are 4 states to be protected, we can reserve the 4 code words 
111XX for these 4 states. Then we use flip flops with controlled signals to 
implement these prefix (like Figure 3 shows). The normal states (i.e., states 
that we do not want to control their access) will have different prefix and 




Figure 3: A normal T flip flop (on the left) and a T flip flop with controlled 
input (on the right). 
However, when the number of states to be protected is not a power of 2, 
there will be unused codes with the prefix reserved for safe states. If the 
synthesis tools assign any of these unused code to other states, these states 
may gain unauthorized access to the protected states and make them 
unsafe. To prevent this, we apply the state duplication method proposed in 
[23] to introduce new states that are functionally equivalent to the safe 
states (see Figure 4) and mark them also as states to be protected. We 

























Figure 4. Reconstructing an FSM by duplicating state S [23]. 
 
Figure 4 depicts the concept of state duplication. For state S which has m 
previous states "+1, "+2, . . . , "+. and X next states "1, "2, . . . , "X (as 
shown on the left), we can create a new state "’ and then connecting "’ 
to all the next states of ", but partition the previous states of " such that 
some of them go to the new state "’ and others still go to state ". Clearly, 
these two FSMs are functionally equivalent. However, by doing this, " has 
a duplicate. If " is a state we want to protect, we need to protect its duplicate 
"’ too. As a result, the number of states to be protected will increase. 
Consider an FSM with n states, 2^ − 1 < ≤ 2^, we apply the state 
duplication method to extend the total number of states that need to be 
protected to the nearest power of 2, 2k. The new FSM will have no more 
than 2r+1 states. So this technique will introduce no more than one 
additional FF to the design.  Accordingly to Yuang et al. [23], the process of 
state duplication gives us an opportunity to minimize power and/or area. 
We will report the design quality information (in terms of area, power, and 
delay) in the next section.     
4. Experimental Results 
4.1 Experimental setup and security vulnerability of current FSM 
synthesis flow  
To validate the findings on the security risks of current sequential system 
design flow and the effectiveness of our proposed approach, a selection of 
Microelectronics Center of North Carolina (MCNC) sequential benchmark 
circuits, shown in Table I, in their kiss2 finite state machine format, were 
used. The first column gives the index for each benchmark circuit. The next 
4 columns show, for each circuit, the name, the number of states, the 
number of input bits, and the number of transitions specified in the blif file 
[25]. Note that in the blif format, one transition may include multiple input 
values that move the current state to the next state. For example, if there 
is a transition from state L to state K on any of the following input values: 
1000, 1001, 1010, and 1011, this will be represented in blif format by only 




The last three columns in the table provide information for a more accurate 
description of each circuit. We first split each transition into edges, where 
each edge corresponds to only one input value. For example, the above 
transition on input 10xx will be split into 4 edges. The column “Number of 
Edges” gives the total number of edges in each circuit. From this, we can 
easily calculate the “Number of don’t care edges” shown in the next column. 
For example, in the circuit 1 (bbara), there are 4 input bits, which means a 
total of 24=16 different input values. For each of the 10 states, there will be 
16 edges, giving a total of 160 edges. The benchmark has 155 edges. So the 
number of don’t care edges is 160-155 = 5. The last column gives the number 
of don’t care states which can be computed as follows on the same example. 
We need 4 bits to encode 10 states, but 4 bits will implement 16 states, so 
the number of don’t care states is 16 -10 = 6.  
































1 bbara 10 4 56 155 5 6 
2 bbsse 16 7 53 1800 248 0 
3 bbtas 6 2 20 20 4 2 
4 
beecoun
t 7 3 27 50 6 1 
5 dk14 7 3 47 47 9 1 
6 dk15 4 3 27 27 5 0 
7 dk16 27 2 105 105 3 5 
8 dk27 7 1 12 12 2 1 
9 dk512 15 1 27 27 3 1 
10 ex3 10 2 33 33 7 6 
11 ex4 14 6 20 416 480 2 
12 ex5 9 2 30 30 6 7 
13 ex6 8 5 32 216 40 0 



































15 keyb 19 7 167 2408 24 13 
16 planet 48 7 114 6016 128 16 
17 S1488 48 8 250 12160 128 16 
18 S1494 48 8 249 12160 128 16 
19 s208 18 11 150 36352 512 14 
20 sand 32 11 183 63552 1984 0 
21 sse 16 7 55 1824 224 0 
22 styr 30 9 164 15296 64 2 
23 train11 11 2 24 24 20 5 
24 train4 4 2 12 12 4 0 
 
In most of these FSM benchmarks, each state is reachable from every other 
state in the FSM. There is no need to protect such states. To produce FSMs 
with states to be protected, we modify these benchmarks slightly by 
removing a small amount of transitions from the blif file so that not all of 
the states are reachable by all other states. In order to edit the FSMs, a 
program was written to read in an FSM, then remove transitions, one at a 
time, and record how many states have become unreachable from other 
states. This process is repeatable and strictly controlled to prevent an 
excessive number of transitions from being removed so the modified circuit 
can still reflect the original benchmark. The number of transitions being 
removed from each circuit is shown in the second column of Table II. In 
most cases, we only remove a couple of transitions. Similar to Table I, we 
expand these removed transitions and reported the number of edges being 
removed in the next column.   
The first objective of this work is to demonstrate the vulnerability of 
traditional FSM synthesis and design flow. We treat states that are not 
reachable by some states in the FSM as states to be protected and consider 
all other states as normal states. We then use ABC [24] (a public logic 
synthesis and formal verification tool) to synthesize each of the FSMs to 
obtain their circuit implementation. Next we analyze these circuit 




states now become reachable from any normal states, these protected states 
will be considered unsafe. The number of such unsafe states are shown in 
the last column of Table II. Note that for circuits 4, 7, 15, and 19, there are 
no unsafe states, which means that the circuit implementation of these 
FSMs are trusted. However, the circuit implementations of the rest of the 
20 FSMs are all untrusted.   







Number of edges 
removed Unsafe States 
1 4 5 2 
2 3 56 7 
3 4 4 1 
4 3 3 0 
5 9 9 2 
6 5 5 2 
7 3 3 0 
8 2 2 4 
9 3 3 5 
10 3 3 7 
11 1 32 11 
12 2 2 5 
13 2 32 2 
14 1 1 5 
15 3 24 0 
16 1 128 19 
17 1 128 23 
18 1 128 13 
19 3 512 0 
20 1 1024 31 










Number of edges 
removed Unsafe States 
22 2 48 9 
23 1 1 3 
24 2 2 2 
 
Our next goal is to show that, given the vulnerability of the FSM synthesis, 
how attackers can gain unauthorized access to those unsafe states. For this 
purpose, we consider the aforementioned “random walk attack”, where the 
attacker randomly starts with a normal state that could not reach the 
unsafe state in the original FSM. Then random inputs are generated so that 
the attacker could move around in the completely specified circuit 
implementation of the FSM. When the attacker reaches the unsafe stated, 
we mark the state as breached. For this experiment, we attempt to breach 
an unsafe state 10,000 times from a random starting state, and allow the 
attacker to generate up to 100 random inputs. For each circuit, we choose 5 
unsafe states to attack. If a circuit has less than 5 unsafe states, we test all 
of them. Table III shows the results of our testing.  For all of the rows with 
“n/a”, those circuits do not have any unsafe states. The last column shows 
a very high breaching rate, 63.28% on average and close to 100% for almost 
half of the circuits. The three columns in the middle indicate that among 
the 10,000 attempts, in the worst case the attacker can succeed with only 
one or two input values. And in all but 4 benchmarks, the average input 
length to gain unauthorized access is less than 20.  























1 913 9.68 58.50 1.50 9.13% 
2 1252.6 10.29 22.80 1.60 12.53% 
3 7457 2.51 17.00 1.00 74.57% 
4 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 


























6 10000 3.18 24.00 1.00 100.00% 
7 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
8 10000 4.63 31.25 2.00 100.00% 
9 10000 4.18 33.60 1.60 100.00% 
10 8701 17.21 70.80 1.80 87.01% 
11 9953.2 18.26 98.40 4.60 99.53% 
12 9989.8 8.64 60.20 1.20 99.90% 
13 9998 12.11 94.00 1.00 99.98% 
14 9927 13.10 71.80 1.80 99.27% 
15 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
16 9633.4 22.23 83.60 4.60 96.33% 
17 5.2 6.10 23.20 3.00 0.05% 
18 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00% 
19 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
20 7165.4 42.24 100.00 3.40 71.65% 
21 379.2 1.49 4.80 1.20 3.79% 
22 1224.8 51.72 99.20 4.60 12.25% 
23 2707.67 2.29 11.67 1.33 27.08% 
24 7479.5 2.02 13.50 1.00 74.80% 
Average 6328.31 12.65 50.87 1.96 63.28% 
 
4.2 Experimental results on attacks from malicious designers 
A malicious designer of a sequential system has access to the original 
system specification and can add transitions to the blif file before FSM 
synthesis. (Note that we do not consider the case that the attacker removes 




functionality of the FSM will not be implemented and such an attack can 
be detected relatively easily by verification tools.)  For an attacker to gain 
unauthorized access to a protected state while hiding this malicious 
behavior, the attacker only need to add one transition, for example by 
specifying a previously don’t care transition from a normal state to the 
protected state to make the state unsafe. As we have discussed earlier, a 
naïve way to prevent such attack is to make the FSM completely specified 
by specifying all the don’t care states and the don’t care transitions.     
Tables IV-VII report the impact on design quality by this simple attack and 
its naïve countermeasure. We use area, power, maximal negative slack (the 
difference between the circuit’s timing requirement and the longest delay 
from input to output, which measures how good the design meets its timing 
requirement), and the sum of negative slack as the metrics for design 
quality. In all of the tables, the original FSM is synthesized once to give us 
the baseline for comparison. We assume that the malicious attacker will 
add only one transition to breach the system. We allow the malicious 
attacker to add different transitions and design the system 10 times. The 
overhead of best malicious design and the average overhead over all the 
malicious designs compared with the baseline are reported in the next two 
columns. The last column is the design overhead when we apply the simple 
countermeasure to ensure trust in the design.   












overhead of  
all malicious 
designs 
Overhead of  
the naïve 
countermeasure 
1 63568 0.0% 12.9% 157.7% 
2 170288 -19.1% -3.7% 155.6% 
3 40368 -10.3% 0.6% -6.9% 
4 63568 1.5% 7.3% 19.0% 
5 163328 -28.4% -5.5% -20.7% 
6 79344 -6.4% -0.4% 85.4% 
7 263552 -2.3% 14.4% 33.8% 
8 28304 0.0% 15.9% 52.5% 














overhead of  
all malicious 
designs 
Overhead of  
the naïve 
countermeasure 
10 79808 -11.0% -3.1% 79.1% 
11 91872 -7.1% 13.5% 116.7% 
12 69600 -5.3% 13.6% 76.7% 
13 167040 -9.2% 2.9% 130.6% 
14 86304 -13.4% -0.3% 67.2% 
15 284432 -17.3% -6.5% 34.3% 
16 841696 -1.5% 14.2% 68.7% 
17 880208 -8.1% 9.8% 50.9% 
18 889488 -2.2% 8.2% 46.3% 
19 115536 -6.4% 3.7% 214.5% 
20 779056 -10.9% 6.3% 84.8% 
21 162400 -5.4% 7.3% 221.1% 
22 934960 -31.7% -18.9% 11.5% 
23 36656 -6.3% 25.0% 215.2% 
24 19952 11.6% 31.8% 209.3% 
Averages:   -10.0% 5.7% 89.6% 
 
First, as we can see from these tables, for most of the circuits, the best 
malicious designs have negative overhead in area, power, and slack, which 
means that the untrusted circuit implementations indeed have better 
design quality. This is not surprising because this is the best design quality 
when the malicious designer tries to add a single transition for each 
possible way to break the system. The impact on design quality by adding 
one transition may not be dramatic, but if the attacker  designs the system 
multiple times, each time with a slightly different FSM, the synthesis tools 
may find a design with better quality. For example, in Table IV, there are 
only 2 circuits with area increase in the attacker’s best design. 
However, when we look at the data of the attacker’s average design, we see 
an overhead of about 6% along each of the quality metrics. This result is 




one more transition will incur design overhead; however, the design 
overhead is so small that such attack cannot be detected by simply 
evaluating the design quality. Consider the power consumption data in 
Table V, only 8 out of the 24 benchmarks have more than 10% power 
overhead. The power overhead on other circuits might not be noticeable, 
and indeed there are power savings on 6 circuits. 











of  all 
malicious 
designs 
Overhead of the 
naïve 
countermeasure 
1 387 -2.3% 25.0% 202.5% 
2 1250.2 -21.3% -5.7% 147.3% 
3 236.7 -7.6% 8.7% -2.5% 
4 441.1 -3.9% 6.3% 21.8% 
5 1211.8 -25.3% -3.6% -17.0% 
6 578.5 -3.7% 0.2% 86.8% 
7 1999.8 0.9% 16.2% 34.2% 
8 163.1 0.0% 27.5% 77.1% 
9 557.6 -17.2% 2.6% 26.0% 
10 592.6 -16.3% -4.8% 83.7% 
11 657.3 -6.0% 16.2% 124.5% 
12 501.4 -9.5% 14.9% 74.3% 
13 1293.7 -11.3% 2.1% 121.2% 
14 677 -20.1% -3.9% 55.3% 
15 2066.2 -20.5% -7.6% 36.8% 
16 6520.6 -1.6% 14.1% 67.2% 
17 6941.4 -11.1% 7.4% 43.4% 
18 6969.3 -4.6% 6.5% 41.9% 














of  all 
malicious 
designs 
Overhead of the 
naïve 
countermeasure 
20 5939.7 -12.2% 6.4% 71.8% 
21 1177.7 -9.2% 7.4% 224.9% 
22 7252.3 -32.7% -20.9% 9.5% 
23 243.7 -9.7% 27.9% 249.8% 
24 134.6 -0.2% 26.0% 210.8% 
Averages:   -11.4% 6.8% 92.8% 
 
Finally, the last column shows the design overhead by the simple protection 
mechanism. We have already analyzed in the previous section that such 
approach will make the FSM completely specified and thus over-constrain 
the design, resulting in designs with potentially very poor quality. This is 
confirmed in these tables. For instance, Table VI shows that the average 
maximal slack has increased by 44%, which means that the price we pay to 
ensure trustworthiness in FSM synthesis, by this approach, is probably too 
high. Such delay overhead may not be acceptable for many mission-critical 
real time embedded systems.  
In summary, in 15 of the 24 circuits, the average change to the malicious 
circuits’ statistics (area, slack, and power usage) is within ±10%.  The 
average design overhead (see the last row of each table) is less than 8%. 
Furthermore, such overhead is on the sequential component of the circuit 
only. If we consider the entire circuit with the combinational circuitry, the 
overhead will become even smaller. Therefore, it will not be effective to 
detect malicious design by evaluating the design quality metrics. On the 
other hand, it is possible to apply the naïve approach by simply creating a 
sink state out of an unused state and redirecting all the don’t care 
transitions to this sink state. This ensures the trust in the design, but the 
last column shows that the high performance overhead will most likely 
make this approach impractical.  




















1 6.88 -9.4% 8.9% 90.4% 
2 12.63 -15.4% 5.4% 77.7% 
3 4.64 4.1% 14.1% 6.7% 
4 7.67 -12.4% -0.1% 22.3% 
5 13.5 -23.9% -4.6% -7.3% 
6 8.92 0.0% 6.8% 48.9% 
7 19.24 -3.9% 6.6% 12.1% 
8 3.75 0.0% 18.8% 45.3% 
9 8.7 -17.8% 4.6% 3.6% 
10 8.37 -13.1% 0.8% 42.9% 
11 9.2 -9.3% 12.0% 59.6% 
12 8.27 -5.2% 9.8% 22.0% 
13 14.63 -8.3% -0.8% 62.5% 
14 8.56 -11.1% 5.5% 38.7% 
15 17.22 -21.1% -9.6% 5.7% 
16 41.57 -2.5% 11.7% 35.7% 
17 40.25 -9.1% 13.2% 29.3% 
18 43.04 -9.5% 5.1% 16.9% 
19 10.44 -1.0% 14.4% 69.5% 
20 32.04 -12.0% 4.2% 20.8% 
21 12.66 -6.8% 9.2% 129.7% 
22 39.02 -24.6% -14.6% -2.0% 
23 4.43 -10.4% 22.8% 168.4% 
24 3.61 22.4% 33.7% 73.4% 
























1 32.05 -3.8% 11.7% 123.4% 
2 113.19 -15.8% -1.0% 99.3% 
3 20.53 -8.5% 1.7% -9.2% 
4 40.77 -3.1% 5.4% 26.3% 
5 99.34 -26.0% -8.4% -13.3% 
6 53.19 -5.5% 0.8% 82.2% 
7 124.25 5.9% 14.2% 30.4% 
8 14.1 0.0% 29.2% 85.2% 
9 49.34 -20.5% 1.5% 16.0% 
10 44.25 -22.7% -6.1% 63.8% 
11 95.73 -11.0% 10.2% 60.5% 
12 39.38 -6.1% 11.0% 62.2% 
13 137.15 -9.7% 0.5% 69.6% 
14 42.84 -12.0% 8.0% 59.7% 
15 98.12 -17.3% -7.3% 28.4% 
16 966.4 -5.1% 9.1% 39.2% 
17 919.81 -8.8% 13.7% 20.2% 
18 970.58 -6.4% 6.2% 24.2% 
19 56.7 1.9% 18.0% 94.1% 
20 411.65 -11.4% 2.3% 32.2% 
21 107.24 -4.3% 9.9% 170.8% 
22 514.78 -26.5% -15.0% 4.5% 
23 15.53 -14.0% 31.6% 276.8% 






















Averages:   -9.6% 6.7% 66.4% 
4.3 Experimental results on the proposed practical approach 
As explained in the previous section, if we do not care about the next state 
as long as it is not a safe state, we can use flip flops with controlled input 
to establish trust in the logic implementation of an FSM.  To reduce the 
overhead caused by these controlled input signals, the FSM must be edited. 
If the number of safe states is less than a power of two, some of the safe 
states need to be duplicated using a modified version of the process in [23] 
to duplicate the states that will cause the least, or reduce, the overhead.  
The next step requires that we partially encode our FSM using a slightly 
modified version of the encoding algorithm. For example, if we have an FSM 
with 30 states and 8 states to be protected, all safe states will be given the 
same partial encoding in the format 11XXX. The rest of the states will have 
the encodings of 10XXX, 01XXX, or 00XXX. The state encoding algorithm 
or tool will then fill in the Xs with 0s or 1s in the most efficient manner. 
Once this process is complete, the original FSM’s states are encoded using 
the same process but all of the states start with the partial encoding 
comprised of all Xs.  The two FSMs are then compared and the overhead is 
calculated for the FSM that has been modified for protection of the safe 
states in comparison to the original FSM.  These results are reported in 
Table VIII. The ‘encoding bit size’ column shows that in most circuits, we 
will not increase the code length, which means no need of additional flip 
flops. The ‘protected states’ column is the percentage of the protected states, 
which include both the state we want to control the access and their starting 
set of states. The rest of the five columns report the design overhead in 
terms of circuit area, gate count, maximum negative slack, sum of negative 
slack, and power consumption.  
The most important result is that in all the design quality metrics, our 
approach has very limited overhead, from 2.82% in the maximum negative 
slack to 7.49% in the gate count. More specifically, the naïve 
countermeasure’s average overhead on circuit area, most negative slack, 
sum of negative slack, and power over all the benchmarks are 89.6%, 44.2%, 
66.4%, and 92.8%, respectively (as reported in the last columns of Tables 
IV-VII). Our new approach can reduce these overhead to 7.01%, 2.82%, 
5.70%, and 6.33%, respectively. Such overhead is about the same or even 
smaller than the average overhead that a malicious designer will have to 




TABLE VIII. OVERHEAD FOR MANUAL ENCODING AND STATE DUPLICATION WITH 
















1 0.00% 33.33% 9.49% 6.67% 9.35% 15.20% 16.15% 
2 25.00% 33.33% 7.71% 6.58% -2.01% 0.08% 6.52% 
3 0.00% 0.00% -1.20% 0.00% 2.30% -5.66% -2.82% 
4 0.00% 33.33% -5.17% 
-
12.20% 3.71% -1.39% 2.54% 
5 0.00% 33.33% 8.30% 7.14% 2.35% 0.37% 5.58% 
6 50.00% 33.33% 52.13% 57.50% 32.18% 42.11% 38.43% 




10.76% -9.25% -10.68% 
-
11.27% 
8 0.00% 33.33% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
9 0.00% 33.33% -2.66% -2.63% -13.72% -8.57% -5.08% 
10 0.00% 0.00% 53.21% 57.14% 12.69% 60.93% 49.04% 
11 0.00% 33.33% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 




19.23% -13.02% -23.46% 
-
25.11% 
13 0.00% 33.33% 7.84% 5.68% 7.42% 9.55% 9.51% 
14 0.00% 0.00% 21.67% 22.86% 21.68% 26.20% 28.76% 
15 0.00% 33.33% 13.95% 15.13% 14.20% 19.40% 14.01% 
16 0.00% 39.13% -6.01% -6.73% 2.54% 2.99% -7.23% 
17 0.00% 60.00% 10.11% 8.21% 16.13% 14.13% 13.90% 
18 0.00% 60.00% 3.77% 3.12% 4.15% 1.97% 4.00% 
19 0.00% 0.00% 3.54% 8.70% -1.77% -3.12% -2.28% 
20 20.00% 6.67% 5.21% 3.91% -3.66% 6.21% 4.43% 
21 25.00% 33.33% 7.92% 6.17% 0.56% 9.35% 5.19% 

























23 0.00% 33.33% 10.95% 7.14% 7.29% 5.97% 14.15% 
24 50.00% 33.33% 18.60% 37.50% -1.11% -2.50% 16.05% 
Average 7.92% 27.45% 7.01% 7.49% 2.82% 5.70% 6.33% 
 
5. Conclusion 
Sequential systems are very important components in modern system 
design. Designing a trusted sequential circuit is crucial to ensure the trust 
of the overall system. We considered the finite state machine model of 
sequential circuits and defined the notions of trusted sequential system and 
trusted logic implementation. Then we studied several related trust issues. 
First, we showed that the current sequential  design flow generates systems 
that can be easily attacked. Then we show a couple of simple and effective 
methods to attack these designs. Finally, we provided two constructive 
methods to build trusted logic implementations. The first one is a 
straightforward method, based on the sufficient and necessary condition for 
a trusted FSM, but it also introduces a high design overhead. The second 
approach is based on a simple circuit level modification of the flip flops and 
can significantly cut the overhead while also guaranteeing the trust of the 
FSM. We have conducted comprehensive experiments on MCNC 
benchmarks to validate both our findings about the vulnerability in the 
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